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While the Arctic is on the front lines of climate change, it is also on the front lines of 
experiments in governance. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean interest in the Arctic is pressuring 
the Arctic Council, the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, to reconsider how it 
cooperates with states traditionally perceived as non-Arctic. The seafaring states of China, 
Japan, and Korea have commercial interests in the Arctic involving shipping, hydrocarbons, 
and fisheries. Yet questions of identity and power projection are also paramount, as the 
Arctic allows the Northeast Asian countries to display their growing capabilities through 
scientific endeavors and maritime transits. Several of the Arctic Council’s member states, 
namely Canada and Russia, assertively promote national sovereignty and territorially-
ascribed sovereignty in the region. But networks and relations are crucial aspects of activities 
in the circumpolar north, especially when scientific collaboration and natural resource 
extraction require large amounts of capital and cooperation. Flows of capital, goods, and 
people are connecting Chinese consumers with mineral deposits in Greenland and Korean 
engineers with Russian oil oligarchs. At the same time, these flows do not mean that we 
should constrain our thinking about the Arctic to one side of the territory-network dichotomy. 
China promotes the Arctic as a global commons while it simultaneously claims to be a near-
Arctic state, revealing the tension between privileging flows and territory in the circumpolar 
north. I analyze trade statistics, rhetorical framings, and scientific endeavors to understand 
how the Northeast Asian countries are turning their interests in the Arctic into national 
identities and how economic interests in the North Pacific – the Arctic near abroad of China, 
Japan, and Korea – could eventually translate into region building measures and even 
regional identities.  
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The weather becoming clear, we had the opportunity of seeing, at 
the same moment, the remarkable peaked hill near Cape Prince of 
Wales on the coast of America, and the East Cape of Asia.  
– Captain James Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean 
(1784) 
 
 
Time and space are annihilated. We are of the world now. 
–Yukon Commissioner William Ogilvie messaging Ottawa 
upon the completion of the Yukon Telegraph line (1901) 
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Chapter One  
 
Introduction 
 
At Russia’s Sakhalin-II project, 15 degrees south of the Arctic Circle, a Korean-built drilling 
and production platform is extracting liquefied natural gas (LNG) from under the Sea of 
Okhotsk. The LNG will flow through Japanese-made pipes before export, with nearby Japan 
and Korea the largest customers.1 Although Sakhalin-II is south of the Arctic Circle, due to 
the harsh operating conditions, oil and gas corporations mention it in the same breath as 
projects like Shtokman in the Barents Sea north of Russia and the proposed Yamal project in 
northwestern Siberia. This cooperation between Japan, Korea, and Russia in the energy sector 
is occurring in the sub-Arctic, where the three countries’ borders, along with those of China 
and North Korea, meet. In this dissertation, while I aim to discuss Asian interest in the wider 
Arctic, I hope to demonstrate that the concept of the Arctic region itself should be 
reconsidered to include Northeast Asia and the North Pacific. Enhanced region-building 
measures within the North Pacific, combined with a more expansive conception among the 
states with territory north of the Arctic Circle of what the larger “Arctic” region constitutes, 
could foster more effective governance in a space that both the eight Arctic states and the 
Asian countries on their proverbial doorstep increasingly use.  
It is first necessary to define “the Arctic” and the concept of “region.” I do not view 
the Arctic through an essentialist lens that bounds the region based on the Arctic Circle or the 
Arctic tree line. I also seek to avoid defining the Arctic along political lines, such as the five 
littoral states of the Arctic Council or the eight permanent member states. Instead, I draw on 
the growing body of literature on network topology and relational networks by geographers 
(Amin, 2004; Coe, Hess, Yeung, Dicken, & Henderson, 2004; Macleod & Jones, 2007; 
Sheppard, 2002). Emphasizing connections and positionality, I consider how various areas 
within the Arctic fit into global flows and markets, particularly in Northeast Asia. I use this 
term to refer to China, Japan, and Korea. 2 These are the three Asian countries whose interests 
in the Arctic are the most developed, which I discuss in the second chapter. A relational view 
of the Arctic is useful because first, much of the Arctic is a maritime space. It flows into the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, enabling the intermingling of both ocean currents and cultures. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In 2007, contracts were signed that would send 64 percent of the LNG, 16 percent to Korea, and 20 percent 
across the Pacific Ocean to the United States (Gazprom, 2013a.), yet due to the shale gas revolution in the U.S., 
exports are probably more oriented towards Northeast Asia now. 
2 Singapore and India are two other countries with Arctic interests, though they are not as developed. Like 
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Second, the Arctic is increasingly a rhizomatic, networked space where melting sea ice and 
rising commodity prices are creating conditions that bring together scientists, fishermen, and 
investors from all over the world – especially Northeast Asia. 
Although network topology is useful to understanding developments in the Arctic, I 
also argue for the continued importance of territory and proximity. In the third chapter, 
working in a tradition similar to O’Loughlin and van der Wusten (1990) in their research on 
the extent of a Europe-Africa panregion, I examine the idea of a panregion between Northeast 
Asia and the Arctic. The three Northeast Asian countries are heavily engaged in trade, 
shipping, and fishing in the North Pacific Arctic, an area that I argue constitutes their Arctic 
near abroad.  
In the fourth chapter, I consider how China, Japan, and Korea are legitimizing their 
involvement in the Arctic. Paasi (1996, p. 804) suggests that an ideal critical regional 
geography would combine both politico-economic approaches and “questions of
subjectification and identity formation.” As such, I analyze how these three countries are 
building Arctic identities by emphasizing the Arctic’s maritime materiality, promoting the 
Arctic as a global commons, and focusing on their national contributions to international 
polar science. China, Japan, and Korea are producing different visions from the Arctic 
Council member states of what Craciun (2009) terms “circumpolarity.” Northeast Asian 
policymakers, whose countries are typically conceived as being outside the Arctic due to 
their lack of territory, are trying to demonstrate that their countries are in some ways already 
“inside” the region. China and Korea marshal international values such as global heritage to 
support their national interests in strengthening their economies. At the same time, countries 
like Canada are attempting to build a decidedly northern identity that spans the eight Arctic 
countries, creating a clear inside-outside dichotomy. Despite the desire of countries like 
Canada to act independently in the Arctic, the cost of northern industrial activities is often 
prohibitive. This makes international cooperation actually suit a country’s national interest 
even if it might undermine its sovereignty. 
In the fifth chapter, I make the case for Northeast Asian-led region-building efforts in 
the North Pacific. Whereas previously, Europeans led most excursions into the Arctic 
through the North Atlantic, a new hub of economic activity has emerged in the North Pacific 
driven partly by commodities cycles. No political activity, however, has yet complemented 
the increase in economic exchange. The Northeast Asian countries could, however, 
strategically legitimize their involvement in the larger Arctic not by speaking of the region as 
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a global commons open to all, but rather by basing their regional involvement on their 
activity in the North Pacific – their Arctic near abroad. Promoting region building in the 
North Pacific would align with the Arctic Council’s current norms of ascribing legitimacy 
based on territory and, essentially, proximity to the North Pole. Furthermore, the global 
moment in Arctic governance, which reached its apex in the 1990s, has passed. In its place, 
there is a growing trend worldwide towards regionalizing maritime spaces. China, Japan, and 
Korea should move to assist a region-building effort in the nearby North Pacific and its 
surrounding landmasses through sub-national cooperation. Although some countries may 
resist the idea of viewing the North Pacific as an extension of the Arctic, reframing it as a 
unified northern margin of activity could support Asian activities in the wider circumpolar 
north. Taken as a social construct, a region is ultimately an “instrument for action” (Gilbert, 
1988, p. 222). Emphasizing the connections of the North Pacific could improve regional 
governance in what is one of the most highly trafficked areas of the Arctic. It would also 
increase the confidence of the Arctic Council’s member states that border the North Pacific, 
Canada, Russia, and the U.S – the first two of which are arguably the most concerned with 
Arctic sovereignty – in working with traditionally non-Arctic states in a cross-border 
maritime area. 
Ultimately, I conclude that it is most helpful to think about the Arctic in expansive 
terms. We should not constrain our thinking about the Arctic to one side of the territory-
network dichotomy. Networks can have hierarchies, hubs, and spokes, while territory often 
fixes international flows. As Amin and Thrift (1994, p. 2) state, “Globalisation does not 
represent the end of territorial distinctions and distinctiveness.” The international flows 
imbricated in Sakhalin-II epitomize the relevance of both network topology and proximity to 
understanding the shape of the Arctic in the twenty-first century. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Defining Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Interests in the Arctic 
 
As the economies of China, Japan, and Korea continue to demand larger amounts of goods 
and resources, their governments are turning north in pursuit of shipping routes, 
hydrocarbons, and scientific research. Melting sea ice, rising sea levels and eroding 
shorelines are affecting more than the look of the landscape, for the materiality of a space 
shapes social interaction, mobility, and the possibility for conflict (Leitner, Sheppard, & 
Sziarto, 2008). Polar shipping routes are opening not just for littoral Russia and Canada, but 
for any country that seeks to use them. Meanwhile, sites for hydrocarbon and mineral 
extraction are attracting investment in Siberia and Greenland from foreign mining companies 
in places like Australia and Korea. In that sense, the changing materiality of the Arctic is 
altering possibilities for collaboration and regional governance. New possibilities for conflict 
– and cooperation – are arising as countries normally considered non-Arctic states, namely 
China, Japan, and Korea, deepen their involvement in the circumpolar north. In May 2013, 
the Arctic Council, the region’s leading intergovernmental organization, approved the 
applications of these three countries for permanent observer status, though not without a 
certain amount of resistance from Canadian and Russian quarters.5 
While Asian interest in the Arctic has generated many headlines, China, Japan, and 
Korea have actually been involved in the region for decades, if not centuries. A deeply 
historical perspective traces the roots of the Yupik in Siberia and Inuit in Alaska, Canada and 
Greenland across the Bering Strait to Asia. Craciun (2009) notes that the intermixing of 
traditional categories of races and continents in the Arctic peoples of North America, 
Greenland and Eurasia perplexed European thinkers. It was, in fact, the “search for Cathay” 
that “inspired the earliest voyages of Arctic exploration” (Mills, 2003, p. 797), with hardened 
men like English explorer Martin Frobisher seeking Arctic shortcuts to Asia through. Today, 
a melting ice cap is making dreams of a trans-polar route connecting Asia, Europe, and North 
America a more tangible reality.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 It was uncertain whether Russia would agree to the admission of Asian observers until the last minute 
(Chernenko, 2013). Kuzman (2013), however, cites that Russian diplomats ultimately believed admitting the 
Asian countries was the best option for checking their Arctic ambitions.  
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Several authors have analyzed the interests and aims of Asian states in the Arctic. 
China has drawn the most attention (Chaturvedi, 2012; Hong, 2012; Jakobson, 2010; 
Lasserre, 2010; Wright, 2011), while researchers have also analyzed Japan (Coates & Hara, 
2013; Tonami & Watters, 2012) and Korea (Coates & Hara, 2013; Lee, Park, Cho, & Kim, 
2013). Jakobson and Lee (2013) and Manicom and Lackenbauer (2013) also provide useful 
overviews of the Northeast Asian countries’ interests in the Arctic. Shipping, hydrocarbons, 
and scientific research are generally seen to be the main interests of the Asian states. As 
China, Japan and Korea are all are major shipping nations, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is 
an attractive option for shortening the distance between Asia and ports in northern Europe by 
up to 40 percent (Emmerson, 2010). The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment identified the 
possible transformation of these three East Asian countries into Arctic maritime nations as 
one of the most important developments in the Arctic by 2050 (Arctic Council, 2009). 
Shipping aside, with Japan and Korea in particular having few natural resources of their own, 
they seek to diversify their sources of hydrocarbon imports to the north, especially given that 
the high price of commodities has made Arctic resources affordable to develop and the 
geopolitical instability in the Middle East. Finally, as all three countries aspire to expand their 
influence on the international stage, involvement in global scientific efforts is perceived as 
crucial to demonstrating capability. When China sends an icebreaker full of researchers to the 
North Pole, Arctic countries and the media take notice.  
I will first briefly describe the Arctic interests of China, Japan, and Korea, followed 
by an analysis of the extent of an Asian-Arctic region, which I find centers on the North 
Pacific. While a significant body of literature on Asian interests in Siberia and the Russian 
Far East exists (Goldstein & Kozyrev, 2006; Rozman, 2008, 2011; Trofimenko, 1989), this 
research has not been incorporated into an analysis of how these interests translate into Arctic 
aims or into a North Pacific region. 
 
2. 1 China 
 
China first became involved in polar science through the Australian Antarctic program in the 
early 1980s (Mills, 2003), underscoring the inherently collaborative nature in much of polar 
science. The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration was established in 1981, and like 
its Korean counterpart, it first focused on Antarctica. China opened its Yellow River research 
station in Svalbard in 2004. Importantly, however, the country has also ventured into Arctic 
DEFINING CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND KOREAN INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
 6 
social sciences. This is a field that the hard sciences often overshadow in the Arctic.6 The 
polar social sciences division of China’s Polar Research Institute has 16 affiliated research 
universities and institutes spread across the country (Yang, 2012). Chinese scientific efforts 
largely emanate from the public sector, which could explain some of Beijing’s highly visible 
“big science” projects such as sending an icebreaker to the North Pole or trying to land 
taikonauts on the moon. Moreover, with a more authoritarian government than either Japan or 
Korea, it is easier for China to pursue a defined agenda in the Arctic, even though Deputy 
Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue stated that China does not have an Arctic strategy (Kim & 
Blank, 2011, p. 70). A perceived linkage between science, national goals, and 
authoritarianism might be one reason why in a 2010 survey, respondents in every Arctic 
country except Russia ranked China as their “least preferred partner” in the Arctic.7
 Aside from science, China has commercial interests in the resource-rich Arctic. 
Beijing has openly implemented a “Go-Out” policy that involves investing in foreign 
countries such as in Africa to gain access to key inputs and open new markets (Gill & Reilly, 
2007). China’s geopolitical pursuit of South-South cooperation might actually be ushering in 
a new type of South-North cooperation. The Arctic represents a natural extension in its quest 
for raw materials, particularly hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals from places like 
Greenland. Whereas Japan and Korea are particularly interested in the LNG resources of 
Arctic states, China, connected to the Eurasian landmass, has so far paid closer attention to 
supplies that can be shipped in from Siberia and Central Asia through a land-based pipeline 
network. In addition, overland trade between landlocked Heilongjiang and Russia’s Amur 
region is particularly strong (Lasserre, 2003). Moscow has made serious efforts to build ties 
with China, a country that Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky described 
in 2010 as “becoming our serious partner from both positive and problematical sides” (Kim 
& Blank, 2011, p. 313). But China may be turning more towards the seas in its search for 
Arctic resources and shipping routes, as the Arctic Ocean cuts 4,000 nautical miles off of the 
journey to both the European Union and the east coast of North America (Hong, 2012). 
Beijing, like Tokyo and Seoul, seeks to reduce its dependence on chokepoints like the Straits 
of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Until recently, for instance, the humanities and social sciences were under-represented at SCAR conferences 
(“Conference,” 2011). 
7 In the 2010 WDGF Canadian Arctic Survey, respondents in every Arctic Council member state except Russia 
overwhelmingly selected China as the “least preferred partner in dealing with Arctic issues.” Russians ranked 
the U.S. first, Scandinavia second, and China third (EKOS Research Associates, 2011), showing that there 
might even be popular support for Northeast Asian cooperation, at least from Russian quarters. 
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 In China, as in many of the Arctic countries, a combination of science, industry, 
media, and the government craft the country’s polar interests. In summer 2012, Dongfeng 
Nissan (a heavy truck manufacturer), China Central Television (CCTV) and the State 
Oceanic Administration (SOA) jointly launched an expedition to the poles. The television 
program, “The Arctic Trail: Exploration Tour,” which aired on CCTV’s Geographic Science 
Channel, followed the expedition (Xinhua, 2013). This trip paralleled the more scientifically-
oriented landmark fifth expedition of the Chinese icebreaker, Xue Long. These two 
expeditions could be compared to the eight-month deployment in 2012 of the British Royal 
Navy’s ice patrol ship, HMS Protector, to survey and patrol Antarctica, and the widely 
broadcast 2013 “Coldest Journey” expedition of Sir Ranulph Fiennes to cross Antarctica 
unaided on skis during winter. China and the United Kingdom are far from the Arctic and 
Antarctica respectively, so publicized expeditions led by private citizens and the government 
are instrumental in fostering a polar identity and heritage.  
While the Chinese media reports on the heroics of its polar explorers, scientists – 
especially those who are also government employees – connect the dots between Arctic sea 
ice melt and climate change felt at home. Huigen Yang, chief scientist of the International 
Polar Year (IPY) China Program and Chinese Polar Research Institute Director, expressed, 
“The Chinese public has understood the linkage between the unprecedented sea ice retreat in 
the Arctic Ocean in September 2007 and the heavy snow disasters that happened in southern 
China in January of 2008” (Yang, 2012). Demonstrating how identities are actively produced 
rather than being inevitable results of culture or the environment, Cheng Baozhi, a polar 
region governance expert, suggested in The Beijing Review, “Instead of playing up its 
navigation and resource interests in the area, China should emphasize its identity as a ‘public 
goods provider’ to non-state actors, like residents, local governments and enterprises and 
promote cooperation with them” (Baozhi, 2013).. His statement also reveals the possibility 
for scale-jumping economic projects in the Arctic that transcend traditional state-state 
cooperation. As Baozhi is an employee of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, a 
Chinese think tank that regularly consults with the central government, it is possible that 
Beijing will heed his recommendation. China may have already learned from the past failures 
of governments and companies in the Arctic states to prioritize human development. For 
instance, Canadian telecommunications company NorthwesTel’s (2013) website explains: 
“1963: Canadian National Telegraphs is awarded a U.S. military contract to build a 
tropospheric scatterwave system for the Distance [sic] Early Warning (DEW) line. The 
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company immediately recognizes the project's potential for bringing reliable 
telecommunications to communities in Canada's Arctic.” Improving communities came 
second to demonstrating northern military might. But Beijing may already recognize the 
importance of providing public goods to local residents in the first instance, especially now 
that indigenous peoples in Canada and Greenland have significant autonomy. 
 Although China may not have a dedicated Arctic strategy, central planning measures 
from Beijing point to the country’s aspirations in the Arctic. The SOA’s 2012 five-year plan 
deems China a “developing maritime power,” calling for the country a to develop in the 
oceans a “more prominent strategic position in the provision of resources to protect and 
expand space for development” (ChinaAbout, 2013). The plan calls the Xue Long’s 
expedition an “important element” and mentions that a new icebreaker will be built to 
support polar expeditions operating 200 days out of the year (ChinaAbout, 2013). The SOA 
also aims to deepen China’s polar scientific efforts, from glaciology to waterway surveys, 
while increasing international exchange of data. Given these concentrated efforts, China may 
soon have more polar capabilities than some of the Arctic states. For instance, the US 
currently has no heavy icebreaker in operation, as the USS Polar Star and Polar Sea are 
mothballed. Capabilities are important for China as it tries to increase its power-projection 
capabilities at sea. In a comment that echoes Halford Mackinder’s heartland hypothesis 
(1904), Li Zhenfu, a professor at Dalian Maritime University and a prolific Chinese 
commentator on Arctic affairs wrote, “Whoever has control over the Arctic route will control 
the new passage of world economics and international strategies” (in Wright, 2011, p. 15). 
Geostrategic control in the Arctic may thus be more important for China than Japan or Korea.  
 
2.2 Japan 
 
Japan has a longer history of involvement in the poles than either Korea or China. It can 
claim participation in the “heroic age” of Antarctic expeditions thanks to Lieutenant Nobu 
Shirase’s 1910 journey to the continent (Summerhayes, 2008). Japan’s scientific involvement 
in the polar regions dates to the International Geophysical Year 1957-1958, and it set up its 
National Institute of Polar Research in 1973. The country established a polar research station 
on Svalbard in 1990, over a decade before Korea and China. It has also built a total of four 
icebreakers, with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operating the current one, Shirase. 
Furthermore, in national perceptions and imaginary geographies, the Arctic is almost seen as 
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touching Japan. The southernmost extent of Arctic sea ice used to reach northernmost 
Hokkaido (NASA, 2009), but that is changing. An article in Nashojio, the Japanese edition of 
National Geographic, lamented the diminishing ice from the Sea of Okhotsk (McNicol, 
2008). The melting ice could generate negative effects on the local biodiversity and tourism, 
as tourists come to frolic on the passing icebergs each winter McNicol, 2008).   
The Japanese economy also consumes a vast amount of natural resources, many of 
which are found in large supply in the Arctic. First, as one of the world’s largest seafood 
consumers, Japan has an interest in northern fisheries. Second, as the world’s largest importer 
of LNG combined with the recent decision to move away from nuclear power in the wake of 
the 2011 Fukushima earthquake, Japan is attracted to the Arctic’s hydrocarbons. The first 
LNG tanker ever to transit the NSR sailed from Hammerfest, Norway to Tobata, Japan in 
December 2012 (Gazprom, 2012), demonstrating how even if Arctic shipping routes do not 
replace the Suez Canal, they will still be useful for transporting northern resources to Asian 
markets. Japan sits astride the Great North Circle Route linking British Columbia and Alaska 
with ports on the coastlines of Northeast Asia, a point to which I will return in chapter five in 
a discussion of Asia’s Arctic periphery. 
Japan has strengthened its diplomatic efforts in the Arctic. It recently appointed an 
Arctic Ambassador, making it the second Asian country to do so after Singapore. This builds 
on its 2009 application for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, approved in May 
2013 along with the applications of the fellow Asian countries of China, Korea, India, and 
Singapore. Upon Arctic Ambassador Masuo Nishibayashi’s appointment, Deputy Press 
Secretary Naoko Saiki stated, “Japan is, of course, located outside the Arctic region; 
however, as a maritime state and one that attaches great importance to global environmental 
issues, it needs to be appropriately involved in international discussions regarding the Arctic” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013). Despite the designation of an Arctic point 
person, the lack of horizontal cooperation in Japanese bureaucracy has impeded the creation 
of a coherent Arctic policy (Tonami & Watters, 2012). Still, adhering to multilateral regimes 
is important to Japan, which has asked to join any shipping regime on the Arctic (Okada, 
2008). With its interests in fishing, oil and gas, and shipping, Japan seeks to have a voice in 
discussions over regulating maritime activities in the Arctic, whether at the Arctic Council, 
International Maritime Organization, or United Nations. 
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2.3 Korea 
 
Korea does not stretch as far north as Japan, so the national perception of nearness to the 
Arctic is weaker. Despite its physical removal from the circumpolar north, three decades after 
Japan, Korea entered into polar research with the 1987 establishment of the Polar Research 
Laboratory (PRL), focused on Antarctica. In 2004, the PRL expanded to become the Korea 
Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), focused on both the Arctic and Antarctic. Korea, like 
Japan and China, has scientific aims and strategic interests in the polar regions. Korea’s 
economic interests in the Arctic have their origins in former President Park Chung-hee’s 
launch of the Heavy Chemical Industrialization program in 1973.8 The country developed 
industrial technologies like shipbuilding, steelmaking, and petrochemical refinement, all 
useful in the Arctic. During the 1990s, several Korean companies in these industries 
developed ties with their Siberian counterparts (Lee, 1996). These industries were initially 
designed to modernize the country through export-oriented industrialization. Yet Korea’s 
steelmaking and shipbuilding technologies have advanced to the point that they now facilitate 
the country’s overseas power projection, as they are intimately connected to the Korean 
Navy. Its transition to a blue-water fleet has allowed it to participate in multilateral efforts 
such as combatting piracy off the coast of Somalia, which in turn helps to protect Korean 
shipping interests. In that respect, the NSR promises to be not just another trade route for 
Korea, but also a potential second lifeline should geopolitical tensions erupt in the Strait of 
Hormuz. With 99.8 percent of imports and exports by volume carried by ship (Cullinane & 
Song, 1998) and North Korea blocking access to continental Eurasia, Korea is essentially an 
island. It is vital for the country to be able to protect its shorelines and the routes that lead 
into and out of its ports.  
 Korea continues to win the most orders for high-value, technologically advanced 
ships in the world, making the growth of Arctic shipping a possible economic boon for the 
country.910 Deepening his country’s Nordic ties, former President Lee Myung-bak visited 
Greenland and Norway in September 2012. He signed two memoranda of understanding with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 For more on Korea’s Heavy Chemical Industrialization program, see Cumings (2005). 
9 Korea’s shipbuilding industry regained its title from China as the world’s largest in 2011, when it won 47.2 
percent of all of the world’s orders. China captured 29.2 percent of all orders. Japan’s shipbuilding industry is 
the world’s third largest (Want China Times, 2012). 
10 In 2012, Korea won 75 percent of the world’s LNG carrier orders, 67 percent of drill ship orders, and 100 
percent of all orders for floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) and LNG FPSO units (Park, 2013). 
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Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on promoting the NSR and green shipbuilding.11 
The Korea Oceans Institute plans to invest $3.1 billion in the offshore and Arctic sectors by 
2020 (Liang, 2012), revealing the country’s economic stake in the growth of Arctic industries 
like LNG extraction and ice-class shipping. A diversified suite of northern industries is 
important, especially when certain sectors such as shipbuilding falter during economic 
recessions as happened in 2008. Shipbuilding is a major engine for national economic 
growth, constituting 10 percent of the economy (Park, 2012). With Korea expected to lose 
market share in low value-added ships like bulk carriers, the country needs to exploit new 
market demand in high value-added shipbuilding sectors (Won, 2010) in places like the 
Arctic. By contrast, China’s shipbuilding industry of China can continue to grow in the 
lower-value sector of container ships and thus may not need to rely on the Arctic as much for 
future growth. 
 In a visible demonstration of its ice-capable technologies, Korea built its own 
icebreaker, Araon, in 2009. Unlike Japan’s Shirase, which the military operates, the Korea 
Institute of Ocean Science and Technology runs the Araon. The vessel has participated in 
three scientific expeditions and will assist in search and rescue exercises in summer 2013 
(Yonhap, 2012), illustrating the expansion of Korea’s involvement in the Arctic. Whereas the 
excursion of China’s Xue Long icebreaker in the summer of 2012 generated many headlines, 
Korea’s icebreaker expedition attracted little such notice. Perhaps this signals that the 
Western media – and the Arctic states – view Korea as more of a friend in the Arctic than as 
a possible competitor or threat.  
Like the other Northeast Asian states, Korea has cultivated its image as a cooperative 
actor in Arctic affairs by emphasizing its interest in climate change research and indigenous 
livelihoods. Moreover, in 2008 under President Lee Myung-bak, Seoul adopted a strategy of 
“Global Korea”12 that reorients the focus of its foreign policy strategy away from the Korean 
Peninsula and towards the rest of the world. That same year, it applied for Arctic Council 
permanent observer status and launched a program of “Low Carbon, Green Growth.” 
President Lee called green growth “a future strategy that will enable a Miracle on the Korean 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For a detailed analysis of the memoranda of understanding between Korea and Norway, see Bennett (2012).  
12 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea (2009) further elucidates the details of “Global 
Korea.” Although a new president, Park Geun-hye, has taken office since the strategy’s release, new presidents 
usually continue the successful policies of the previous administration, albeit under a different name (Snyder, 
2012). 
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Peninsula to succeed the Miracle on the Han River”13 (Korea, 2011, p. 3). With sustainable 
development one of the Arctic Council’s stated goals (Arctic Council, 1996), Korea has 
found a way to make its economic interests dovetail with the organization’s environmental 
interests. Indeed, KOPRI’s website states that in 2013, the institute “moved into the 
knowledge based economy R&D” (KOPRI, 2013), clearly unifying polar scientific and 
economic aims. 
 
2. 4 Tying Together Northeast Asian Interests 
 
Although none of the Asian states publicly voiced support for each other’s bids for Arctic 
Council observer status, some experts have expressed that Asian cooperation in the Arctic 
could be a possibility. Seon-hee Eom, a researcher at the Korea Maritime Institute, suggested 
in an article that “cooperation with China and Japan may be considered in discussing the 
exploitation of Arctic fishing grounds” (2011, p. 46). Chinese officials have also mentioned 
that the Arctic could serve as a vehicle for East Asian cooperation. Following the transit of 
two German cargo ships from South Korea to the Netherlands via the NSR in 2009, Chen 
Xulong of the China Institute of International Studies remarked that not only is Arctic 
shipping important to developing China’s northeast region and coastal areas: in addition, “it 
is of importance to East Asian cooperation as well” (Hong, 2012). Yet not much has 
materialized. So far, there appear to be separate but overlapping Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean activities in the Arctic rather than cooperative Northeast Asian involvement. Japan 
and Korea are also more closely allied across the Pacific to the United States, its military ally, 
than China. It is possible that Korea and Japan do not want to be dragged down by their 
neighbor, seen as suspect because of its “perceived belligerence in its own claimed maritime 
areas and because of the widely held misperception that it claims some portion of the Arctic 
Ocean” (Manicom & Lackenbauer, 2013, p. 1)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 “Miracle on the Han River” is the name often given to the economic growth and modernization created by 
export-led industrialization between 1961 and 1996, which democratization also accompanied. For more on the 
“Miracle,” see S. Lee and Yoo (1987). 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Economic Space of the Asian-Arctic Region 
 
3. 1 A Brief History of Arctic Integration with Global Markets 
 
At various times in history, peoples from far-flung parts of the planet have traipsed 
northward, integrating the Arctic into their own economic systems. Although Frankel (1986) 
argues that the Arctic has historically proven to be an obstacle to northern shipping, there has 
actually been a wealth of economic activity, much of it based on the sea, for centuries. From 
the fifteenth through twentieth centuries, Europe was home to some of the world’s most 
powerful seafaring states, making the North Atlantic the most commonly used entry point 
into the Arctic by peoples such as Basque, Dutch, and English whalers during the seventeenth 
century. Remnants of an old fishing station in Quebec stationed by Basque and Inuit peoples 
from 1680-1730 signify cross-cultural collaboration (Smithsonian Arctic Studies Center, 
2013). Like the Sakhalin-II platform illustrated in the introduction, this fishing station 
exemplifies a “nodal” formation, a “manifestation of propinquity and multiple spatial 
connectivity” (Amin, 2004, p. 43). Europeans even made it to the high Arctic, with the 
Basque, English, and Dutch pursuing whales around Svalbard. None of these sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century actors came from what are today considered Arctic states. This speaks to 
Arctic’s fluid and continually changing political geography. The construction of the Arctic 
region is an ongoing process, and in this context, Northeast Asian interest should not be 
unexpected.  
 While mercantilism once drew countries to the Arctic in search of wealth to fill their 
national treasures, commodities cycles are now driving a significant amount of economic 
activity in the Arctic. When the price of oil is high, as it was in the 1980s and as it has been 
since the turn of the twenty-first century, multinational corporations pursue exploration in the 
Arctic. Discourses of sovereignty emphasized by countries like Canada and Russia 
overshadow the longstanding importance of foreign investment and involvement in the 
commodity-rich Arctic, even though Canada has long played host to foreign investors in one 
form or another such as the Hudson’s Bay Company – an early day multinational corporation 
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–in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.14 In 1973, Canada’s Trudeau government 
introduced the Investment Canada Act, which attempted to make sure that any foreign 
investment into the country would be beneficial (Wahn, 1973). As countries like Korea 
research constructing an LNG terminal in the Northwest Territories, “beneficial” could 
possibly have different interpretations for indigenous people, government officials, and the 
vast majority of Canadians, who do not live in the Arctic.  
 
3.2 The Asian-Arctic Region as a Process 
 
To consider the production of an Asian-Arctic region, it is helpful to think of a region as a 
dialectical process. A region conditions society, while society enables a region (Gilbert, 
1988). Regions are not static, unchanging entities: Pred (1986) argues that they are constantly 
“becoming.” Yet a better word to describe the Asian-Arctic region is not so much 
“becoming,” which tends to obscure the importance of agency, as “being produced.” 
Different actors are producing different conceptions of what the Arctic region entails and 
what Asian interests mean for the Arctic. Adopting a historical perspective is important when 
analyzing a region as a process because it reveals how regions rise and decay over time; 
regions in fact depend on both place and period (Taylor, 1991). Taylor pinpoints 1991, the 
close of the Cold War, as the end of the region of Atlantic Europe. Similarly, we could mark 
1987, when Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev made his Murmansk Speech, as the starting 
point of the circumpolar Arctic.15 2013, the year in which the Arctic Council admitted Asian 
observers, could be the start of a more networked, globalized Arctic region. Given this 
contextual perspective, regional geography is more than just a way of understanding the 
world. It is actually an “instrument for action” (Gilbert, 1988, p. 222) that, in the Arctic, both 
conditions and is enabled by national governments and circumpolar indigenous organizations, 
local residents and multinational corporations, and scientists and TV producers, to name a 
few.  
 Northeast Asian policymakers’ rhetorical justifications of Asian involvement in the 
Arctic demonstrate how economic interests are translating into strategies and investments in 
regional identities. Massey (1991) argues that communities do not need to be in the same 
place to exist, so it is possible that, for instance, the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation organization, which stretches from Indonesia to Chile, could eventually spark !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 On the Hudson’s Bay Company, see MacKay (1970).  
15 For more on the Murmansk Speech, see Scrivener (1989) and Åtland (2008). 
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the emergence of an actual Asian-Pacific community in which people share an identity. 
China, Japan, and Korea are each attempting to engineer a national identity in the Arctic 
partly based on national endeavors, but also by calling upon a “global polar culture,” as I will 
highlight in chapter four. Yet it is debatable whether the Arctic Council has even succeeded 
in producing a polar identity amongst its member states. Uneven development, for one, could 
preclude the creation of an imagined community or shared identity in the Arctic. Residents in 
cities like Tromsø can purchase a banana from Peru or hop on a plane to London, allowing 
them far different lifestyles than the residents of remote communities in Nunavut, whose 
nearest neighbors might be iron ore mines. Both groups of people are connected to global 
flows of trade and investment, but in vastly different ways. Thus, there is not one ideal way 
to define the Arctic. Instead, it is more helpful to view it through a prism of multiple regional 
structures and identities, with some parts of the Arctic more integrated and tightly knit than 
others whether by proximity, transportation connections, or ease of economic exchange.  
 
3.3 Arctic Exports to Northeast Asia 
 
Studying the export strengths of the Arctic countries to China, Japan, and Korea reveals the 
contours of the Arctic as a resource periphery to Northeast Asia. Research into an Asian-
Arctic region builds on the work of sociologists like Wallerstein (1979) on core-periphery 
relations and geographers like O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten, who questioned the 
existence of a “Eurafrica” panregion (1990). Key thinkers in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century German Geopolitik such as Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer initially 
proposed the idea of panregions, which connected core areas to peripheral places that 
supplied resources (O’Loughlin & van der Wusten, 1990). The U.S. National Intelligence 
Council (Fingar, 2008, p. iv) predicts that by 2025, “a global multipolar system is emerging 
with the rise of China, India, and others.” The Arctic constitutes a periphery from which 
resources are extracted to fuel growth in the developed core, of which China, Japan, and 
Korea are members. Generally speaking, Asian economic interest in the circumpolar north is 
best characterized by pinpointing two maritime zones of activity where Arctic products 
complement current Asian demands: the North Pacific and the larger North Atlantic region, 
stretching from Murmansk to Iceland and Greenland. Most helpful would be to investigate 
trade at a sub-national level, although this is difficult due to the lack of reliable data from 
countries like China and Russia. A full suite of data could help show where incorporation of 
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Arctic resources into local economies in Northeast Asia has proceeded the furthest. In broad 
terms, the Arctic’s vast forests, bountiful fisheries, and plentiful sources of oil and gas attract 
resource-poor Japan and Korea, especially given those countries’ energy-hungry 
manufacturing sectors. Asian consumers also want Norwegian salmon and even Swedish-
designed Ikea furniture.16 Commodity cycles have made once expensive, remote-seeming 
Arctic resources like oil, gas, and minerals affordable to develop. The LNG market is 
regional rather than global, and it is at its most expensive in East Asia.17 Rather than 
increasing accessibility due to climate change, the price of commodities and worries over 
securing energy resources is actually leading this round of Arctic oil and gas exploration 
(Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009). Furthermore, for Japan, the Fukushima nuclear disaster has 
led the country to dramatically increase its purchases of oil and gas – an unexpected event 
that is reshaping regional connections.  
In the North Pacific, Alaska, Canada, and the Russian Far East all have close ties to 
Asia. In 2009, over 50 percent ($733 million) of Alaska’s international exports went to 
China, Japan, and Korea (Campbell, 2010), a significant increase from a decade ago. 
Alaska’s main export to Asia is seafood, while timber is also important.18 Thus, as Asia’s 
economies grow, so could Alaska’s. Moreover, connections from Russia’s Far East and 
British Columbia are often stronger with Northeast Asia than western Russia or eastern 
Canada, respectively. British Columbia has strong economic and cultural ties with Asia, 
perhaps speaking to the eventual development of new regional identities; already in 
Vancouver, nearly 28 percent of residents have East and Southeast Asia origins (Statistics 
Canada, 2012). In 2012, exports to Japan, China, and Korea totaled over CAN $12 billion, 
more than for any one province except Alberta and Ontario (BCStats, 2013). BCStats also 
lists the “Pacific Rim” as an export area rather than the usual “East Asia,” exposing how the 
concept of a Pacific region has even spread into Canada’s record books, which are probably 
not intended to market exciting trade opportunities. More publicly, in 2007, Canada launched 
the Asia-Pacific Initiative, which loftily describes that in the twenty-first century, “as in the 
Renaissance when Venice facilitated the meeting of the West and the Orient, this Asia Pacific 
Initiative envisions British Columbia – Canada’s Pacific Gateway – as the Venice of the 
Pacific Century and the crossroads between Asia and North America” (Ministry of Economic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 China is Ikea’s second-biggest market (Bloomberg, 2013). 
17 The price of LNG is $14.50 per mBTU in East Asia as opposed to only $4.10 in the U.S. (Wright, 2013). 
18 Asian countries value the strong, vertical-grain wood that the state produces (Roos, Brackley, & Sasatani, 
2011). 
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Development, 2007, p. 10). The government of British Columbia also calls the province 
“Canada’s Pacific Gateway,” a case of economic interdependency translating into identity 
and action. Thus, any reluctance from Canada to approve the Asian applications for Arctic 
Council observer likely would have stemmed from Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
sovereignty-focused political agenda rather than British Columbia, so closely tied as its 
economic interests are to Asia. 
3.4 Maritime Connections  
More than simply serving as a destination for resource extraction, the Arctic has also acted as 
a throughway to markets that may seem almost improbable today. During the sixteenth 
century, Arctic Russia served as a midway point between England and the Caucuses en route 
to the riches of Persia and the Arab world (Curtin, 1984). In 1555, the London-based English 
Muscovy Company established maritime trade with Archangelsk in pursuit of forest products 
(Etkind, 2011). English merchants rounded the North Cape, sailed through the Barents Sea, 
and then continued south through the rivers of northern Russia to Moscow, ultimately to the 
Caspian Sea.. Today, the NSR is the Arctic route most often billed as a type of shortcut, in 
this instance between Europe and Asia. 
 Following in their centuries-old history as maritime nations (and recent history as 
countries with sizeable LNG carrier fleets), Japan and Korea have built economic ties with 
coastal destinations in the Arctic along the NSR and Pacific Rim. The Great North Circle 
Route connects Shanghai, Yokohama, Dutch Harbor, Vancouver, and Seattle, while a short 
detour also incorporates Vladivostok. Approximately 3,100 ships sail in each direction along 
the route annually (Economist, 2007). As cities and ports along China’s coastline grow 
wealthier and as Beijing constructs LNG terminals on the country’s coast, China can be 
expected to continue its maritime thrust. The Northeast Asian countries are actively 
attempting to facilitate northern shipping by signing memoranda of understanding with Arctic 
countries, advancing their shipbuilding industries, and vocalizing their interests in helping to 
develop the Polar Code. The Northeast Asian countries stand to benefit from improved 
shipping infrastructure, as better infrastructure can redistribute trade flows and generate 
larger volumes of trade (Rietveld & Nijkamp, 1992, p. 17). A well-developed NSR could 
increase growth at both ends and all along the route (although the possibility for uneven 
development also exists). If the sea ice melts enough and sufficient infrastructure is created, 
there could one day even be a Trans-Arctic shipping route linking the cornfields of the 
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Canadian prairie provinces and American Midwest through Churchill, Canada to markets in 
Asia. The environmental consequences of such a sea change would be drastic and could 
dramatically restructure global commodity chains. Yet even trans-Arctic shipping has a 
precedent. During the 1960s, the USSR imported wheat from Canada through the Port of 
Churchill via the so-called Arctic Bridge shipping route (“Three,” 1966), illustrating once 
again that climate is not the only determinant of trade relationships in the Arctic. 
Though often trumpeted in the media as the next big shipping route, the NSR, let 
alone the Arctic Bridge, can hardly compete with the Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal 
at present. One of the challenges with turning the NSR into a competitive route is the lack of 
significant economic activity and ports along the route itself. This is problematic in an age of 
pendulum shipping, when ships generally make multiple ports of call during one voyage 
(Rodrigue & Browne, 2002, p. 175). Singaporean shipping companies have no plans to 
expand into the north (Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011), while Japanese business also does not yet 
perceive the NSR to be competitive. Yet a sizeable amount of maritime activity already exists 
at both ends of the NSR in the North Pacific along the Great North Circle Route and in the 
North Atlantic, where the Vikings’ voyages took the seafaring people from Scandinavia to 
the shores of Newfoundland and Maine. Eimskip, an Icelandic shipping company, recently 
moved its U.S. port of call from Norfolk, Virginia to Portland, Maine to reduce shipping 
times to Europe (Eimskip, 2013). In turn, it has connected New England timber and seafood 
producers with consumers in Iceland, Norway, and even Russia, pointing to a revival of the 
North Atlantic region that Taylor (1991) claims ended in 1989. Olafur Hand, Eimskip’s 
marketing director and an Icelander, asserted, “We found this place one thousand years ago. 
And now we're back” (Bell, 2013). 
 In the North Pacific, the historical nature and depth of commercial activity illuminate 
the economic region’s shape. All of the countries surrounding the North Pacific engage in 
industrial-scale fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, and Bering Sea. Shipping, too, 
has long been important. In 1968, Japan and the USSR started a joint cargo liner service to 
Canada (Fairhall, 1971, p. 58). Today, LNG shipment epitomizes the geographic reach of the 
region’s capital flows. The first LNG carrier to transit the NSR sailed from Hammerfest, 
Norway to Tobata, Japan in December 2012. The Russian state-owned company, Gazprom, 
chartered the Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged Ob River, a carrier that Korean 
company Hyundai Heavy Industries built in 2007. Previously, Ob River had exported LNG 
from Sakhalin-II to Japan. On its voyage through the icy NSR, three Russian icebreakers 
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guided the carrier. Researchers from Krylov State Research Center and Sovcomflot were 
onboard studying ice navigation, showing the interdependencies of science and commerce in 
the Arctic. Commercial activity provides a means for underfunded scientists to access the 
Arctic, while they in turn produce the expertise companies need to operate in the region. In 
sum, Ob River’s transit reveals the interconnections between extractive industries in Norway, 
transportation and science in Russia, heavy industry in Korea, and economic demand in 
Japan. 
3.5 Northern Gateways, Windows, and Pivots to Asia 
Trade also creates diffuse networks in the Arctic and sub-Arctic, which are home to many 
geo-economic “gateways,”  “windows,” and “pivots” to Asia. This is not surprising for an 
area with extensive coastlines and present and future seaports. Most ports pursue a marketing 
strategy of “establishing privileged positions to access hinterlands” (Rodrigue & Browne, 
2002, p. 169), revealing how territory is portrayed as physically networked to a wider world 
of flows rather than being fixed, unmoving spots on a map. In the Arctic, cities and ports are 
almost always gateways from the north to other parts of the world; only Tromsø markets 
itself as the “Gateway to the Arctic” – and rather successfully at that, having won the right to 
host the Arctic Council Permanent Secretariat. These gateways bear a similarity to the 
wormholes that Sheppard (2002) uses to describe rapid connections between geographically 
distant parts of the globe. For instance, the Port of Churchill’s website bills itself as 
“Canada’s only Arctic seaport,”20 which “brings the world of ocean trade to the doorstep of 
Western Canada” (Port of Churchill, 2013). It is possible that Asian interest in the Arctic 
could eventually expand to this remote location, but in the meantime, more places in the 
Arctic are positioning themselves as gateways to the markets of Asia, whether by virtue of 
proximity or rapid connections. The many gateways located in the North Pacific illustrate the 
region’s growing economic interconnections and the way in which territory and location are 
represented relationally. Cities and regions do not adhere to “territorial integrity” (Macleod & 
Jones, 2007, p. 1183), as Amin (2004, p. 34) argues that “they are made through the spatiality 
of flow, juxtaposition, porosity, and relational connectivity” (in Macleod & Jones, 2007, p. 
1183). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Canadian Geographic’s website (2011) states, “Although technically, the Hudson Bay watershed is part of the 
Arctic Ocean watershed, it is often studied as its own system” (2011). Yet it is debatable whether the Hudson 
Bay is actually part of the Arctic Ocean’s watershed, even though the body of water, like the Sea of Okhotsk, is 
an important part of the “high latitude cryosphere and climate system.” (Lewis & Jones, 2000, p. 101).   
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Figure 3.1 Shipping Activity in the North Pacific and North Atlantic. 
 One of the most important hubs of Asian-Russian trade is the so-called “gateway” 
port city of Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In the 1990s, Japan, 
Korea, China, Finland, and Italy negotiated agreements with the governor of Primorsky Krai 
for participation in a Greater Vladivostok Free Economic Zone, though it did not come to 
fruition (Christoffersen, 1994). Ferries sail to Japan and Korea, flights connect to both Alaska 
and Northeast Asia, and one of the city’s main industries is repairing and reselling old 
Japanese cars. Vladivostok is located in Primorsky Krai (the “Maritime Province”), which is 
supposed to be Russia’s “window on the Asia-Pacific” (Christoffersen, 1994, p. 517). In 
2009, Putin announced, “We can position Vladivostok as Russia’s ‘gateway to the Pacific’” 
(Putin, 2009). The distinction between window and gateway is an important one, as the latter 
implies a sense of control with the city acting as a “gatekeeper for Russia’s regional 
relations” (Christoffersen, 1994, p. 525). Rozman (2008, p. 37) attests that Vladivostok, “the 
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maritime gateway to the Korean peninsula, Japan, and coastal China, becomes the pivot in a 
triangle reaching to Khabarovsk and Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk and beyond to Russia’s vast 
northeastern expanses.” Although Vladivostok is located far from the Arctic Circle, it sits at 
the eastern end of the NSR, meaning that it could be an important transshipment hub for 
Arctic resources to reach their ultimate destinations whether across the Pacific or south 
through the Sea of Japan. The strategic meaning of Rozman’s “pivot” is thus more economic 
than political. Vladivostok is more akin to a trade hub than a point on the map considered 
crucial to possess for global domination. Moscow also notably designed to designate 
Vladivostok as the host city for the 2012 APEC Summit rather than the decidedly more 
European locales of Moscow or St. Petersburg. The Kremlin’s overall strategy in 
Vladivostok, a city it sees as a crossroads of economic exchange, exemplifies what Deleuze 
(1994, p. 385) identifies as the State pursuing “a process of capture of flows of all kinds, 
populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc.” Yet the port city could lose 
its prime position as a pivot in Northeast Asia without adequate investment from Moscow or 
the continued support from the Kremlin for globalization, running the risk of turning into an 
“outpost” rather than a “gateway” (Rozman, 2008, p. 47), or even a mere passive window 
onto the North Pacific.  
At the western end of the NSR lies the North Atlantic region, another zone of Asian 
interest that partly hinges on Iceland. The North Atlantic island nation has leveraged its 
geographic location to position itself as a potential transshipment hub – another sort of 
gateway to multiple destinations. Previously, it served as a mandatory refueling stop for 
flights between North America and Europe. Iceland is now once again trying to reposition 
itself as a sort of North Atlantic pivot, particularly since the departure of the U.S. Air Force 
from its base in Keflavik in 2006.22 China has taken a particular interest in this tiny North 
Atlantic island, with which it signed a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2013 – the first between 
a European country and China (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013). The joint statement 
issued by the two countries upon the announcement of the FTA called for heightened 
political dialogue on issues such as “human rights, gender equality, labor issues, Arctic 
affairs, as well as cooperation on geothermal development, culture, education and tourism” 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013). The FTA is therefore more than an economic 
agreement: it is also an attempt to bring two disparate countries closer together on a host of 
political and environmental issues, even in areas where Iceland, which has had a lesbian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For more on Iceland’s geopolitical positioning, see Dodds and Ingimundarson (2012). 
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prime minister, and China, infamous for its human rights abuses, are arguably miles apart. 
Furthermore, the FTA conveys that Iceland is possibly reorienting itself away from the EU 
and more towards Asia. Although Reykjavik is thousands of miles away from Northeast Asia, 
flows of capital and goods could bring Asian vessels to the Icelandic capital in the near 
future.  
 
3.6 Economic Cooperation between Northeast Asia and the Arctic 
 
As the China-Iceland FTA demonstrates, the Arctic countries, particularly the Nordic 
countries and Russia, have reciprocated Northeast Asian interest in building economic ties. 
Norway’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Trond Giske, expressed at the World Expo Day in 
Korea in 2012, “Korea is a very important market for Norwegian industry and the seminar 
held here in Yeosu today shows that there is a lot of commitment to and interest in further 
developing this collaboration on both the Korean and Norwegian sides” (DNV, 2012). He 
highlighted green shipping, maritime offshore and oil and gas sectors as “common interests 
in exciting areas” (DNV, 2012). Indeed, trade between Norway and Korea is growing rapidly, 
increasing 70 percent in 2011 (Norsk Industri, 2012). The high-tech industries of Korea and 
Japan, which are more developed than China, complement the Arctic’s primary sectors, 
particularly offshore oil and gas. Demonstrating the advances in bilateral cooperation, 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Moscow in April 2013, the first such visit by 
someone in his position since 2003. With Japan’s growing need for LNG imports and the 
growth of LNG development in Russia, there is a natural fit between the two economies. 
Ratti and Reichmann (1993) argue that border regions have moved from being “front lines” 
of sovereign states to socio- economic “contact zones,” (in Blatter, 2004, p. 532) yet I argue 
that the hard and fast divisions wrought by the Cold War were actually an aberration in a 
longer history of encounters and contacts between diverse peoples in places like Northeast 
Asia and Alaska.  
China and Japan differ in their pursuit of international cooperation. In Northeast Asia, 
China favors cooperation led by central governments and economic development that 
includes investment, official development assistance, and loans. By contrast, Japan prefers 
regional participation centered on the Sea of Japan, “with local governments making 
decisions, through the private sector, primarily with trade, letting economic cooperation 
emerge naturally” (Christoffersen, 1994, p. 517). This difference in strategy manifests itself 
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in the larger way in which China and Japan pursue investment in the Arctic, and as I will 
explain in the next chapter, science. With the government largely responsible for funding 
research and development in China, science often takes the form of big, publicly visible 
efforts like icebreaker expeditions or moon landing programs, whereas Japanese and Korean 
research and development is often done on a smaller scale by private companies. Thus 
whereas the Arctic states sometimes perceive China, with its centralized government, as 
having a unified strategy in the Arctic both politically and economically, they do not see 
Japan as such a monolithic, determined actor.23 It is likely that China, rather than Japan, will 
sooner deliberately match economic and political strategy in the Arctic, just as the China-
Iceland FTA has shown.  
 
3.7 An Asian Turn in the Arctic’s Economic Integration 
 
Asian interest in the Arctic is the newest iteration of centuries-long foreign interest in the 
circumpolar north. Trade connections and transportation linkages are increasing in the North 
Pacific, an area that constitutes Northeast Asia’s Arctic near abroad with Russia serving as an 
important crossroads between Asia and North America. The NSR could eventually bridge the 
two zones of maritime activity in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. Despite the 
growth in the economic region of the North Pacific, political region-building efforts lag 
farther behind. However, there has already been small if significant movement towards 
establishing political ties to match the economic space, if only on a bilateral level, with the 
China-Iceland FTA the primary example. Yet no politicians have come forward speaking of 
an Arctic community that includes Northeast Asia in the same way as happened during the 
1980s before the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization or 
equally during the 1990s before the establishment of the Arctic Council. Instead, Chinese, 
Japanese, and Korean diplomats, politician, and scientists reframe the Arctic as a global 
space for foreign investment and international scientific efforts, as I turn to in the next 
chapter.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For instance, when Chinese businessman Huang Nubo attempted to purchase land in eastern Iceland 
equivalent to one percent of the country’s territory to ostensibly develop a tourist resort, his plans came under 
fire and attracted international attention. Iceland’s interior minister, Ogmundur Jonasson, rejected Huang’s 
request for an exemption from a law that prohibits foreigners from owning land. “One has to look at this from a 
geopolitical perspective and ask about motivations,” Jonasson admitted (Higgins, 2013). This type of statement 
did not surround interest by Korea’s KOGAS in developing an LNG terminal in the Northwest Territories, even 
though the company is state-owned.  
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Chapter 4 
Northeast Asian Productions of Circumpolarity 
China, Japan and Korea’s applications for observer status are the formalized outcomes of an 
extensive set of interests in the Arctic originating from both governmental and business 
sectors. To support their applications and legitimize their Arctic activities, the Asian states 
are trying to position themselves as near-Arctic states by constructing Arctic national 
identities and, in the process, redefining what the concept of “Arctic” encapsulates. At the 
same time, these countries are promoting a global polar culture to justify their involvement in 
the circumpolar north. Altogether, lacking territory north of the Arctic Circle, China, Japan, 
and Korea have instead been trying to establish their regional legitimacy through actions that 
ultimately abide by the rules of engagement. I identify three key means by which the Asian 
states construct their Arctic identities to legitimize their participation in the region: taking 
advantage of the Arctic’s maritime materiality and circumpolar position, rhetorically framing 
the Arctic as a global space, and performing internationally collaborative scientific research.  
4.1 Whose Circumpolarity? 
While certain Arctic countries may view Asian interest in the region as surprising, viewed 
from Asia, it may appear to be a natural development. The circumpolar north connects Asia, 
North America, and Europe, continents normally perceived as disparate and distant from one 
another. This “circumpolarity” “peripheralizes all of the imperial centres of the northern 
hemisphere, presenting us with a wholly alien planetary vision” (Craciun, 2009, p. 104). Yet 
this alien planetary vision may only be foreign to Westerners, as conceptions of time and 
space are social constructs (Harvey, 1989), and maps are ideology (Connery, 1994, p. 31). 
Baudrillard (1981, p. 2) declares, “The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it 
survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – the precession of simulacra – 
that engenders the territory.” The polar azimuthal projection used in most maps of the Arctic 
and the United Nations logo has helped shape a vision of the Arctic as a region centred on the 
North Pole, but an actual intergovernmental organization: the Arctic Council. By contrast, the 
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Mercator projection draws more attention to the Arctic as a periphery of the Atlantic or 
Pacific Oceans. 
In comparison, the Chinese perception of the seas is not as fragmented as its Western 
counterpart. In Chinese, the word for “sea” literally translates to “vast, expansive space” 
(Schottenhammer, 2012, p. 67). The sixteenth-century voyager Zheng He declared in a tablet 
that his voyages under the Ming Dynasty were successful in “unifying the seas and 
continents” (Duyvendak, 1938). The oceans have played an important role for Asia for 
thousands of years, and at least since 1000 BC in China (Schottenhammer, 2012). Like the 
Arctic Ocean today, China’s surrounding seas were paths to both goods and knowledge.24 
Northeast Asia was connected to the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean – a geographic 
connection that may seem unusual to Westerners. Thus, viewed in a longer historical context, 
the Northeast Asian retreat from the world’s oceans starting in the eighteenth century is an 
anomaly. By exploring the Arctic for shipping potential, science, and fishing, the Asian states 
are picking up where their forebears left off several centuries ago. Indeed, the Chinese 
government has promoted Zheng He’s voyages as a symbol of the country’s long history of 
peaceful expansion.25  
The Asian states are building polar identities by capitalizing on their maritime 
heritage and the watery spaces of the Arctic. Steinberg (2001, p. 31) argues that modern 
capitalist territorial construction perceives the ocean as a secondary, extra-state space 
“beyond the essential state-territories in which ‘society’ occurs.” Yet the theme of China’s 
recent celebration of the United Nations World Oceans Day was “building maritime power,” 
and one of the day’s goals was to “enhance people’s awareness of the ocean” (National 
Oceanic 2013). Maritime power is seen as necessary to develop a “marine ecological 
civilization” (海洋生态文明建设) (National Oceanic, 2013), demonstrating a view of 
civilization that straddles both land and sea as opposed to more diametric Western 
conceptions.  Thus, the Central Arctic Ocean actually plays a primary role in the (arguably 
capitalist) Northeast Asian states’ Arctic identities because it is the only place in the high 
latitudes that they can freely access via the seas, aside from their research stations in 
Svalbard. In Western popular culture, the ocean is viewed equally as both a space of flows to 
cross in search of new investments and a home to past heroics (Steinberg, 1999) – a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The sea route from Japan to China served as a route for scholars seeking Buddhist knowledge on mainland 
Asia (Schottenhammer, 2012, p. 73). 
25 At an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting, Chinese state councilor Dai Binguo stated 
that Zheng He’s “treasure fleet” brought “porcelain, silk and tea rather than bloodshed, plundering or 
colonialism” (Murphy, 2010). 
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perception that appears to persist in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures, too, given those 
countries’ activities in the Arctic. Korean fishermen, for instance, are seeking out Arctic 
fishing grounds to combat financial woes in existing depleted fisheries and to meet high 
domestic demand for northern species like Pacific cod and Alaskan pollock (Eom, 2011, p. 
2). Yet those economic needs sit astride a national self-perception of possessing the 
capability to sail across the world’s oceans, with the Araon (Korean for “All-Ocean”) 
icebreaker leading the way in the Arctic.  
The Northeast Asian countries’ perceptions of the status of the Central Arctic Ocean 
contrast with their views towards the seas bordering East Asia. In the East China Sea, China 
and Japan dispute ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and in the Sea of Japan, Japan 
and Korea tussle over the Dokdo Islands. By contrast, none of the Asian states have any 
claim to territory in the Arctic Ocean. It serves as an arena for China, Japan and Korea to 
compete with each other in a manner that does not risk military conflict as much as other 
geographic regions where land is contested. Japan’s Mitsubishi, Korea’s Korea Gas 
Corporation (KOGAS), and China’s PetroChina each have a 20 percent stake in an LNG 
plant under development in Kitimat, British Columbia (PetroChina, 2012), illustrating the 
ability of the Asian countries’ companies to work together in the energy sector when the 
resource in question is not on disputed home turf.  
Partly because they have no territorial claims to the Arctic, Asian government 
officials speak of a “polar culture” that belongs to the globe rather than to any particular 
country or ethnic group. Although this envisioning superficially parallels Craciun’s call for a 
planetary and decolonial circumpolarity (2009), the argument could be made that although 
the Asian countries may not be treating the Arctic as a literal colony, they are in fact treating 
it as a resource periphery. To justify their extractive efforts, Asian politicians, subconsciously 
or not, draw on similar visions as eighteenth-century European imperialists. British, French, 
and German explorers portrayed the landscapes in the parts of the world subject to their 
colonial and exploratory enterprises as “uninhabited, unpossessed, unhistoricized, unoccupied 
even by the travelers themselves” (Pratt, 2003, p. 51). African peoples, for instance, were 
described as without lifeways and culture (Pratt, 2003, p. 53). In a similar manner, Huigen 
Yang, Chinese Polar Research Institute Director, closed his speech at the 2012 IPY 
conference in Montreal by saying that with the continued development of multipolar 
linkages, “a more creative and harmonious polar culture will be cultivated for a sustainable 
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planet.”26 Such a suggested polar culture overlooks the existing circumpolar or, at the very 
least, transnational cultures that exist amongst some of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples. 
Yang’s discourse does not aim to strengthen and expand existing indigenous polar cultures so 
much as replace them with a globalized and essentially rootless, deterritorialized one. At the 
2013 Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø, Korean Ambassador Lee to Norway expressed, 
“Korea will do its due part by joining forces so that the Arctic Frontiers will open a new 
horizon for all the peoples of the world.” In line with the country’s projection of itself as a 
concerned global citizen, he continued, “Changes in the Arctic gravely worry us Koreans as 
global citizens, since we care deeply for the future of our earth and for our next generation” 
(Lee, 2013). Allott (1992), in his discussion of the international law of the sea, suggests that 
we consider “our” as a participatory rather than possessive pronoun. Only some countries, 
notably the Arctic and Asian ones, are actually participating in the Arctic, while residents of, 
say, the sixteen landlocked African countries largely do not. Consequently, it is important to 
note the identity and motivations of the actor(s) behind the production of any vision that uses 
the word “our” as a global referent. 
The idea of creating a polar culture for the benefit of all mankind rarely emanates 
from the Arctic states, which advocate regional stewardship, even if it is founded on 
international laws like the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Many of the Arctic 
states do not view the Arctic as the common heritage of mankind, perhaps in part because 
today’s commodities prices have made the seabed more valuable than it ever was. The Arctic 
states increasingly are incorporating their Arctic regions into their identities, with Canada and 
Norway emphasizing their respective polar heritages, for instance. They do not want the 
Arctic to be seen as a terra nullius onto which a global polar culture could be projected. As 
an example, when the Norwegian government’s 2011 white paper, The High North: Visions 
and Strategies mentions the word “global,” it is in the context of climate change having 
global ramifications. The word is not used to imply the creation of a global polar culture in 
which all of mankind would benefit from the Arctic’s development. Likewise, Canada’s 
agenda during its 2013-2014 chairmanship highlights a more parochial view of the region 
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2013). !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Also notable is the use of the word “harmonious,” a popular term in Chinese domestic and foreign policy 
initiatives. The use of the word “harmonious” helps illustrate the peaceful nature of China’s “going-out” 
strategy. For a discussion of the importance of the “harmonious” concept in Chinese policymaking circles, see 
Zheng and Tok (2007). 
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It is possible that the Arctic Ocean could be defined as an enclosed or semi-enclosed 
sea, at which point it would be the responsibility of the surrounding states to coordinate 
regional management under Article 122 of UNCLOS. Down the line, international networks 
of scientists in the Arctic could rub up against stricter boundaries at sea. The Arctic states are 
attempting to stake out “rational” borders based on scientific data showing the extent of their 
continental shelves. Should, say, Canadian and Russian claims to their extended continental 
shelves end up extending as far as desired, they could possibly erect barriers to other 
countries doing scientific research in their waters. Article 56 of UNCLOS mandates that in 
the exclusive economic zone, coastal states have jurisdiction over marine scientific research. 
That means that in the future, coastal states could block scientific research expeditions by 
countries like China and South Korea. Their icebreakers would still have the right of innocent 
passage, but not necessarily the right of scientific research. Fishing could also be restricted, 
since Article 56 allows coastal states sovereign rights (but not sovereignty) over the seabed 
and the resources in the waters above. Without the ability to perform science or fish in the 
Arctic Ocean, the Asian states would lose a large part of their projected polar identities. 
!
4.2 Discursively Framing the Arctic 
 
The project of building Arctic identities involves overlapping frameworks of regional 
identities in which China, Japan and Korea project themselves north and south with the aim 
of turning rhetoric into political reality. Their extensions northward form a part of each 
country’s broader strategy of participation in the multilateral community. China, for instance, 
positions itself as a near-Arctic state at the same time as it builds ties with Central Asian 
states and Russia through the Shanghai Co-operation Organization. In Africa, where China is 
sometimes called the “dragon in the bush” (Large, 2007), the country invokes its two-
thousand year old historical ties with Africa as a basis for its continued involvement in the 
continent (Alden & Alves, 2008). Beijing is not recalling historical involvement for purely 
“crude economic instrumentality” but rather to “reconcile China’s self-imposed identity as a 
developing country with its emergence as a global power” and demonstrate that it will not 
harm the interests of other, poorer countries (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 1). The invocation of 
historic ties parallels government officials’ recollection of Zheng He’s voyages as friendly 
and peaceful. China also employs a discourse of “solidarity” emphasizing that like African 
countries, it, too, is developing. Yet in the Arctic, the Northeast Asian states, as part of their 
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attempt to rework the Arctic into a global and deterritorialized space, do not claim solidarity 
so much as subtly delegitimize any claim the Arctic countries or peoples have to a heightened 
risk to climate change. In a 2009 speech in Stockholm called “My Homeland is Melting,” 
Mary Simon, president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), stated: 
“I am not portraying Inuit as simple ‘victims’ of climate change. Our people have 
occupied the Arctic for thousands of years. We are on the front lines of climate 
change and this presents us with both unique and exceptional challenges.” (ITK, 
2009). 
“Homeland,” “front lines,” and “exceptional” are all words that situate residents of the north 
as uniquely affected by climate change. By contrast, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean officials 
claim that the Arctic states are not exceptional at all. In his 2013 Arctic Frontiers speech, 
Korean Ambassador Lee proclaimed, “Climate change is being felt in every corner of the 
world. Korea is no exception. In fact, Koreans feel the impact of climate change acutely” 
(Lee, 2013). 
 Despite their lack of territory in the Arctic and attempts to put a global veneer onto 
the Arctic, Asian policymakers also tenuously claim presence and proximity to foster Arctic 
identity building. These discursive practices highlight the continuing importance of territory 
in determining legitimacy in and belonging to a region. In the Arctic, none of the Asian states 
can claim historical presence dating more than fifty-odd years, but this amount is often cited 
at the beginning of government officials’ speeches as if to legitimize their continued 
involvement. Perhaps showing that Beijing ultimately does not believe that the country 
belongs to the Arctic region, Hu Zhengyue, Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
remarked in a speech in Svalbard, “While the Arctic is mainly a regional issue, climate 
change and international shipping also make it an inter-regional issue” (in Hong, 2012, p. 
54). Yet still, trying to play up their geographic proximity to the north, Chinese 
representatives have called their country a “near-Arctic state” in speeches,28 using a term 
made popular by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.29 In his 1987 Murmansk Speech, he 
opined, “The potential of contemporary civilization could permit us to make the Arctic 
habitable for the benefit of the national economies and other human interests of the near-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Chinese Ambassador to Norway Zhao Jun called China a “near-Arctic state” in his speech at the Arctic 
Frontiers conference in January 2013 (Zhao, 2013). 
29 China is not alone in using terminology such as “near-Arctic.” In the UK, written evidence submitted to the 
Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee called the country a “sub-Arctic nation” with political, 
economic, environmental, scientific, and popular interests in the Arctic (Dodds, 2012). 
NORTHEAST ASIAN PRODUCTIONS OF CIRCUMPOLARITY 
 30 
Arctic states, for Europe and the entire international community.”30 His willingness to let the 
Arctic benefit the “entire international community” is rarely heard from Arctic states today. 
 China’s practice of claiming that it is a “near-Arctic state” parallels the European 
Union’s (EU) efforts. The Chinese province of Heilongjiang is situated close to the 50th 
parallel, just like the EU member states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The EU’s Northern 
Dimension initiative has attempted to increase regional cooperation between the Baltic 
countries, Nordic countries, and Russia. The policy describes itself as covering “a broad 
geographic area, from the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic to the southern shores of the 
Baltic Sea, countries in the vicinity and from north-west Russia in the east, to Iceland and 
Greenland in the west,” combining disparate parts of Europe in one fell swoop to produce a 
northern region. Powell (2011) suggests that the EU’s Northern Dimension could eventually 
translate into Arctic strategies. Latvia is nearly as far from the Caspian Sea as the Arctic 
Ocean, yet the EU is not recontextualizing Riga’s location to win a seat at discussions on 
Caspian Sea management. The actions of both China and the EU reveal how sub-Arctic 
territory is situated to be used as strategic footholds to the circumpolar north.  
 In the two-year lead-up to the decision on their countries’ applications for Arctic 
Council observer status, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean government officials have promoted 
their countries’ rule-abiding natures. Whereas in 2010, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army declared, “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the 
world as no nation has sovereignty over it” (Kim & Blank, 2011, p. 309), military officials 
and politicians have since avoided making such statements. Since the 1990s, respect for the 
rule of law has experienced a revival both within countries and internationally (Carothers, 
1998). The Asian countries promote the rule of law to ensure that they are respected members 
of the advanced world. China, Japan, and Korea are able to project power in the Arctic’s 
maritime spaces and claim them as part of the global commons while simultaneously 
enhancing their identities as advanced and rule-abiding countries. During the meeting of 
Senior Arctic Officials in Stockholm in November 2012, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Shuji Kira, expressed, “As a State who has always valued the 
‘rule of law,’ let us reiterate our support to the view expressed in the Ilulissat Declaration that 
an extensive international legal framework, including the law of the sea, applies to the Arctic 
Ocean” (Kira, 2012). When sovereignty is such a hot-button topic for some Arctic states, it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 This is a sentence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who once notoriously lamented that the “demise of the 
Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (“Putin,” 2005), probably would not utter 
today. 
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prudent for non-Arctic states to underscore their respect of the existing regimes in the region. 
Guo (2012), however, points out the irony of Arctic states making respect for the Arctic 
states’ sovereignty a criteria for being an observer when they themselves still dispute 
territorial claims. Thus, the Asian countries are careful to act diplomatically and express 
support for the region’s dominant regimes rather than any particular claims to the continental 
shelf. 
 Other voices in East Asia, however, have expressed arguably more aggressive 
aspirations in the Arctic. A researcher at Korea’s Samsung Economic Research Institute 
stated, “It is necessary to strengthen the permanent observer role of Arctic Council to check 
monopoly by coastal states while introducing global governance in the form of an Arctic 
Treaty” (D.-S. Lee et al., 2013). Lee’s statement is remarkable for two reasons. First, by 
using the word “monopoly,” Lee manifests a sense of injustice towards the perceived 
complete control by the littoral states on Arctic discussions, as if to say that territory should 
not matter in determining who has a say. Consciously or not, his discourse reflects the 
participation of environmental non-profits such as Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature in protests far from their physical homes. Both Lee’s statement and Greenpeace’s 
actions reflect the “nonsovereign territorial nature of ecopolitics” (Kuehls, 1996, p. 118). Yet 
whereas the involvement of transnational environmental organizations in places as far apart 
as Antarctica and Papua New Guinea is almost taken for granted, the involvement of states in 
environmental areas outside of their borders elicits more suspicion. The second remarkable 
aspect of Lee’s statement is his call for the introduction of an Arctic Treaty, which Chinese 
academics have also echoed. In a 2009 article in the Journal of the Ocean University of 
China, Liu Huirong and Yang Fan of the eponymous university’s School of Law and Political 
Science criticized the “helter-skelter Arctic international law system” and the “defects in 
UNCLOS itself.” They instead suggested, “We should proceed with the development and 
improvement of its relevant systems, and we can especially go forth from the special system 
for ‘ice-covered areas’ in striving for the founding of a set of new specialized systems, 
directed at Arctic circumstances, for the resolution of Arctic environmental issues” (in 
Wright, 2011, p. 10). If a government official from any non-Arctic state were to make such a 
bold statement, it would likely be seen as interfering, which Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo do not 
want to be perceived as doing.  
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4.3 Constructing Polar Identities 
 
Developing Arctic identities is about more than outward projections. It is also a project that 
involves constructing the “imagined community” of the nation (Anderson, 1991). Many of 
the Arctic states formerly saw their northern hinterlands as an exotic periphery. In the 
Russian imagination, from the early eighteenth century to the end of the twentieth, 
circumpolar hunters and gatherers were nearly invisible and served as “the most consistent 
antipodes of whatever it meant to be Russian” (Slezkine, 1994, p. 1). While the hinterlands of 
the Arctic used to be a sort of inscrutable and enigmatic northern Orient, the twentieth 
century witnessed many of the Arctic countries begin emphasizing historical presence in their 
northern regions in national narratives.31 When non-Arctic states similarly build Arctic 
identities and narratives, however, these acts arouse suspicion among the more territorial and 
possessive Arctic states.   
While there are numerous articles on the identities of Arctic states and the region’s 
place in their popular cultures and national identities (c.f. Dodds & Ingimundarson, 2012; 
Bergh 2012; Manicom, 2013), less research has investigated polar popular cultures in China, 
Japan, and Korea, with the notable exception of Wright (2011). This gap in the literature may 
be because the icy north does not enjoy a vaunted place in Asian popular cultures as the site 
of heroic polar explorations. While the Asian states might be able to convince the Arctic 
states that they, too, have Arctic identities, their populations are not as easily persuaded. 
Asian polar narratives are essentially projects of the foreign ministries aimed at international 
audiences rather than national ones. Even within Arctic states, Arctic affairs are often an 
esoteric topic.32 Chinese television shows on Iceland and the occasional ice floe off the coast 
of Hokkaido bring the Arctic closer to Asian residents’ doorsteps, but the circumpolar north 
is still on the popular periphery. Yet perhaps the Chinese, at least, view the Arctic as closer to 
home than Canadian or Russian politicians might like. A cursory glance at Wikipedia, while 
not a reputable resource, still provides possible insight into the nation’s psyche. On the 
English-language website for the Arctic, the map used portrays the region as all of the area 
north of the Arctic Circle (“The Arctic,” 2013). By contrast, the map used on the Chinese (“
北極,” n.d.), Japanese (“!",” n.d.), and Korean (“北ᯉ地区,” n.d.) Wikipedia websites !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 For an understanding of how scientific expeditions in the north served national interests in fostering 
citizenship and building empires, see Bravo (2009) and Sörlin (2006), respectively.  
32 Even in Canada, where Arctic issues figure somewhat high on Ottawa’s radar, the 2010 WDGF Canadian 
Arctic Survey found the economy to be respondents’ top concern (EKOS Research Associates, 2011). 
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spans northern Japan and China. Unlike the Anglophone map, the Asian map notably 
displays the 10 degrees Celsius isotherm, a method of bounding the Arctic that covers a 
wider area than the Arctic Circle includes the Bering Sea.  
4.4 Promoting Scientific Efforts 
Crucially in the Arctic, where climate change science is high on the agenda for Arctic states, 
China, Japan, and Korea are highlighting their contributions to international science. The 
three countries are enhancing their identities as advanced nations by engaging in scientific 
research worldwide, and the Arctic is only one part of a global thrust. The number of co-
authored papers between Chinese and non-Chinese scientists has increased (Wagner & 
Leydesdorff, 2005), illustrating the country’s increasing international collaboration. The 
world share of academic publications published in China and Korea also jumped significantly 
from 1993-2004 (Zhou & Leydesdorff, 2006). More specifically to the poles, in Polar 
Biology, a growing amount of articles have been published by Asian states, particularly Japan 
(Piepenburg, 2008). It is easier for the Asian countries to carry out science in the Arctic than 
in places like the Amazon because of the Arctic’s maritime nature. Moreover, due to the 
perceived urgency of climate change by thousands of scientists and several multilateral 
organizations,33 the Arctic Council, every Arctic state, and much of the global community 
perceive polar scientific research as vital.34   
As discussed in chapter two, Beijing focuses on state-funded “big science” efforts in 
the Arctic. By contrast, in Japan and Korea, a larger proportion of research and development 
(R&D) has historically been funded by the private sector (Sakakibara & Cho, 2002).35 The 
expertise of Japanese and Korean companies in shipbuilding and offshore technology has 
granted them the opportunities to collaborate in areas where China has not, such as 
Sakhalin,36 the Yamal Peninsula,37 and Hammerfest.38 Yet regardless of whether the state or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 In its reports and publications, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has repeatedly stressed the 
need for urgency in responding to climate change. 2,300 scientists signed the Fourth IPCC Report in 2007. A 
recent report, “Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation” 
(IPCC, 2012), uses the word “urgent” or “urgency” 22 times.  
34 Although policymakers from the Arctic states may vocalize their belief in the importance of polar science, this 
does not always translate into funding. In Canada, federal funding was cut for the Polar Environment 
Atmospheric Research Laboratory in Nunavut, while a freshwater research station in Northern Ontario was also 
closed (“Closing,” 2013).  
35 In Korea, however, many of these private firms are chaebol protected by Korean industrial policy (Sakakibara 
& Cho, 2002). 
36 Japanese companies Mitsui and Diamond Gas Sakhalin (whose parent company is Mitsubishi) have a 12.5 
percent and 10 percent in Sakhalin-II, respectively (Gazprom, 2013b).  
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private sector funds scientific research, it constitutes a form of geopolitical presence. 
Helicopters and submarines may carry potent geopolitical symbolism, but scientific research 
vessels are still painted with national colors, while scientists raise their flags at the North and 
South Poles. Even Antarctica, a continent that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty devoted to science, 
is not immune to geopolitics. During the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year, the U.S. 
deliberately situated one of its research stations on the South Pole, while the Soviets had to 
settle for the arguably less exciting Pole of Relative Inaccessibility and the Geomagnetic Pole 
(Naylor, Siegert, Dean, & Turchetti, 2008). World War II legitimized the linking of scientific 
knowledge with national interest expressed through the military (Barnes & Farish, 2006) – a 
relationship that has developed in China, Japan, and Korea. Haraway (1997, p. 51) terms this 
concept technoscience, the fusion of “worldly, materialized, signifying and significant 
power” Technology and science have become interlinked with the future, progress, and 
modernity. The space race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., China’s efforts to send a man 
to the moon, and Japan’s construction of the first Asian research station on Svalbard in 1991 
all attest to this notion. These demonstrations of sheer scientific capability visibly manifest 
the government’s awesome power, an act Nye (1994) calls the “technological sublime.” !
Svalbard is an important place for Asian countries to materialize and signify their 
power and capabilities. On this remote northern island, China, Japan, and Korea have small 
but notable research stations. Asian officials commonly cite these physical outposts during 
speeches to summon evidence of presence in the Arctic. Svalbard’s unique status as part of 
the Kingdom of Norway that is still party to the international law of the 1920 Spitsbergen 
Treaty has fostered the creation of an international research village. Citizens and companies 
from all of the treaty’s signatory countries are able to visit without a visa, which has 
facilitated scientific access. Yet in Svalbard, there is not one large international station; 
instead, ten different countries have their own stations where they fly their flags, carving out 
tiny bits of territory onto which they can project their identities. Permanent presence is a key 
aspect of agenda setting. Norway’s white paper, The High North: Visions and Strategies 
(2011), states, “The recent establishment of a permanent secretariat for the Arctic Council in 
Tromsø will put Norwegian centres of expertise in an even better position to play a part in 
setting the agenda for international climate diplomacy in the future” (Norwegian Ministry of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Japan’s JGC Corporation and France’s Technip, for instance, together won the tender in April 2013 to 
construct the Yamal LNG plant (Reuters, 2013).  
38 Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries won a USD $1.1 billion in February 2010 to construct and transport an 
FPSO to the Goliat oil and gas field northwest of Hammerfest, Norway (Offshore Technology, n.d.).  
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Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 14) The creation of these centres of expertise are akin to Latour’s 
“centres of calculation” (1987), where knowledge is accumulated following movement and 
circulation elsewhere. !
Science is a means of demonstrating national prowess while simultaneously 
strengthening a country’s position within international networks. Kuehls (1996, p. 41) calls 
the space in which knowledge is transmitted a rhizome, a term Deleuze and Guattari 
developed to mean a space that “connects any point to any other point” with “multiple 
entranceways and exits” (1987, p. 21). Even in rhizomatic space, though, ideas do not flow 
across a featureless plateau. Globe-spanning scientific networks are hierarchical and have 
positionality within them. Wagner and Leydesdorff (2005), for instance, find that China is 
turning into a hub for Asian science, displacing Japan. More and more Chinese scientists are 
co-authoring papers with other Asian scientists, while Japanese scientists’ efforts are not 
integrated to the same extent. Still, Japan, perceiving itself as an advanced country, feels a 
responsibility to carry out research in places like the Arctic. This is because the Arctic is seen 
as part the global commons, an area similar to outer space – a different perception from the 
Arctic states. Koichi Wagata, a Japanese astronaut, stated at a symposium in Japan on human 
space exploration, “I think international collaboration is not just about working together. It 
allows nations that make great efforts and have competitive technological capabilities to 
stand on an equal footing. This applies to science as well as to human space exploration. I 
think this is an area that only nations with advanced technology can participate in, and thus it 
is the responsibility of those scientifically advanced nations to play this role” (JAXA, 2013). 
Scientific collaboration is still viewed through the prism of nationality, especially in areas 
like the Arctic and outer space where only wealthy national governments have historically 
been able to afford the requisite investments. So although initiatives such as the forthcoming 
China-Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai39 demonstrate significant cooperative 
efforts, Arctic science still carries a visible element of nationalism. 
China, Japan, and Korea vary in their projection of national images in the Arctic, but 
all three emphasize their international scientific collaborations. This behavior follows the 
Arctic states’ encouragement and formalization of polar scientific cooperation through 
programs at multiple scales. The University of the Arctic network brings together universities 
in the circumpolar north, while the IPY 2007-2008 involved 10,000 scientists from over 60 
countries (World Meteorological Organization, 2011). Chinese Polar Research Institute !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The China-Nordic Arctic Research Center, endorsed by the SOA, will be funded by China’s Polar Research 
Instititute (Zhenghua, 2013).  
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Director Yang Huigen restated the IPY’s mission when he stated that China’s participation 
helped to achieve “multidimensional polar linkages” (Yang, 2012), speaking to a networked 
vision of the Arctic region. KOPRI’s website proclaims, “Antarctic is the sole part of the 
earth that can help us secure national interests through scientific research while arctic is 
special in light of the fact that the region requires joint development through joint research 
with neighboring countries...Expanding research activities on a continuous basis in these 
earth's last undeveloped and non-polluted regions would be the only way to secure national 
interests for the country” (KOPRI, 2012). This discourse legitimizes Korea’s involvement in 
the Arctic in two ways. First, it presumes that international cooperation is necessary to pursue 
economic development in the region. By contrast, the Antarctic Treaty System prohibits 
economic development on the southernmost continent, meaning that science really is one of 
the few ways for a country to pursue its national interests. Second, the website greeting paints 
the Arctic  as “undeveloped” despite the thousands of years of human settlement, again a 
similar emptying of the landscape similar to European imperialist discourses highlighted by 
Pratt (2003). If the landscape is vacated of people, then it is easier to justify the exploits of 
the supposedly benign and objective scientist. In his study of territoriality, Sack observes that 
in modern, capitalist usage, “territory becomes conceptually and even actually emptiable” 
(1986, p. 87). As the Arctic is symbolically emptied, Korean science – key to the nation’s 
advances in shipbuilding – will fill the void to help secure the country’s national interests. In 
essence, China and Korea invoke the global environmental movement to justify scientific 
research that, while it may benefit climate change research, will also bring national benefits 
both immaterial, like increased prestige, and material, such as better ships – whether 
scientists and diplomats openly admit it or not.  
As climate change does not respect international boundaries, Japanese and Korean 
scientists can claim that it affects their country. A brochure from the Japanese National 
Institute of Polar Research focuses on the Arctic Oscillation and the way in which it affects 
countries at the middle latitudes, stating, “Arctic circulation patterns influence the weather of 
many countries, including Japan” (NIPR n.d.). Just as Russia or Canada might marshal 
bathymetric data to support its own seabed claims, Japan presents allegedly objective 
scientific data to show how the island archipelago, too, has a stake in Arctic climate change. 
While it is relatively easier to deconstruct the analysis of politicians, a sharp and robust 
analysis of the way in which scientific data is presented in the Arctic is equally necessary 
since science and sovereignty have a “history of entanglement” (Bravo, 2009, p. 143). 
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Neutrality can serve as “myth, mask, shield and sword” (Proctor, 1991, p. 262). Since 
scientists purport their work to be objective, we should be especially attuned to hidden 
intentions, geopolitical or otherwise. While various epistemic communities, from 
environmental groups to scientists to policymakers, have been studied to see how they affect 
issues such as climate change (Gough & Shackley, 2001; Toke, 1999; Wilson Rowe, 2012), 
more research should address how scientists affect policy debates in the Arctic, where 
questions of legitimacy and sovereignty are paramount.  
One starting point for such investigation into scientists and legitimacy might be to 
borrow from Kuehls’ study of “ecopolitics.” He uses this term to describe environmental 
problems that neither domestic nor international policy can resolve, for they actually unfold 
in “a space beyond sovereign territory” (1996, p. 117). In the space of ecopolitics, Kuehls 
argues that it is risky to only ascribe authenticity to people based on their position. He 
elaborates, “Discourses of authenticity tend to privilege a certain politics of place that 
coincides with a politics of sovereign territory” (1996, p. 111). He uses the example of 
Midnight Oil, an Australian rock band that helped blockade a logging road in a forest slated 
for logging in British Columbia. The local media questioned why Australian musicians had 
traveled thousands of miles to protest deforestation in a country far from home. Kuehls states 
that the critique of Midnight Oil’s involvement in Canadian environmental politics 
“elucidates the nonsovereign territorial nature of ecopolitics, the extent to which the logging 
of the temperate rain forests on Vancouver Island is not confined to the geopolitical 
boundaries of this sovereign territory but is bound up with a global market for wood 
products” (1996, p. 118). The media would be less likely to question scientists as to why they 
are present in an area outside their home country. But answers to such questions would be 
enlightening, as Arctic science is entangled with globe-spanning issues of climate change, 
shipping, and commodity chains. When China’s Xue Long sailed to the Atlantic and back in 
the summer of 2012, the Polar Research Institute of China stated that the icebreaker acquired 
“practice for our nation's ships that use Arctic passages in the future” (Associated Press, 
2012), openly linking science with commerce.  The Siberian Times (2012) portrayed the 
voyage in a more militaristic light, pronouncing: “China’s snow dragon conquers the Arctic, 
opening up an ocean route linking Asia and Europe.” Perhaps, then, certain media outlets are 
already questioning the supposedly benign nature of scientific expeditions. 
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4.5 A Global Ordering of the Arctic 
 
Through a promotion of a global polar culture and pursuit of collaborative science, Asian 
states are putting pressure on the accepted rules of engagement even while working within 
their confines. In the new ordering of the world, “spatial configurations and spatial 
boundaries are no longer necessarily or purposively territorial or scalar, since the social, 
economic, political and cultural inside and outside are constituted through the topologies of 
actor networks which are becoming increasingly dynamic and varied in spatial constitution” 
(Amin, 2004, p. 33). Chinese, Japanese, and Korean identities in the Arctic rest on perceiving 
the region as a deterritorialized, networked space of flows for science, investment, and even 
identity, given their promotion of a global polar culture. These countries are attempting to 
become hubs in the network of Arctic science and expertise – that is, centres of knowledge 
production – and build the “permanent” (if also occasionally mobile) infrastructure, like 
research stations and icebreakers, needed to ensure the mobility of scientists and sailors alike 
in the Arctic. The Asian countries’ activities are challenging what Craciun calls the 
“imperialized centres of the northern hemisphere” (2009, p. 104), which in the past century 
dominated the world from the top of the planet. By reconceptualizing the Arctic as both a 
networked region and a global space, China, Japan, and Korea are not just upsetting the 
preponderance of the Arctic states in the region-as-territory, but also destabilizing the 
structural integrity of the state system itself in the Arctic.  
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Chapter 5 
 
North Pacific Arctic Region Building 
 
 
The Arctic Council’s perception of the Arctic as encompassing countries with land north of 
the Arctic Circle does not match the areas of economic activity concentrated in the North 
Pacific and the North Atlantic. The organization’s perception of the Arctic is primarily based 
on possessing northern territory but also on a somewhat shared notion among the Arctic 
states of polar heritage and northern identities.40 The Arctic states marshal these factors to 
claim responsibility for environmental stewardship in the Arctic Ocean. Yet a policy of 
ecosystem-based management, like that of the Arctic Council, does not work neatly in 
maritime environments. The porous, permeable nature of the seas makes them susceptible to 
influences carried from far away by ocean currents. Moreover, distant countries can project 
power at sea without an adjacent coastline thanks to the rights of naval and commercial ships 
to innocent passage. The environmental and political permeability of oceans mean that 
geopolitics plays an especially strong role in maritime spatial planning. Suárez de Vivero et 
al. (2009, p. 631) find that in the ocean, “the strict national framework is breached as the 
planning is done in a fluid environment where decisions, interventions, and actions cannot be 
contained/limited to areas inside national jurisdiction boundaries.” The increasing abilities of 
China, Japan, and Korea to project maritime power in the Arctic Ocean further complicate 
attempts to manage and govern its high seas. Yet since few ships currently sail in the Central 
Arctic Ocean, a more useful strategy for China, Japan, and Korea might be to transform their 
proclamations of being “near-Arctic states” into actual region building in the heavily used 
space of the North Pacific.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Although Steinberg later acknowledges that “ocean-space, like land-space, serves a crucial role in the 
reproduction and development of the world-system” (2001, p. 24), the Arctic littoral states, particularly Canada, 
are almost trying to seamlessly unify their ocean-space to their land-space and make them more of the national 
core rather than the periphery.  
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5.1 The Arctic’s Spatial Mismatch 
 
Although the Arctic states realize that many of the region’s environmental problems span 
political boundaries, this appreciation has not stopped them from erecting new environmental 
boundaries in their place. Larsen (2005) maintains that the production of environmental 
boundaries makes possible the erosion of political boundaries. Yet especially in fluid 
maritime areas, the production of boundaries is a pointless exercise for regulating the 
environment. In the Arctic, the greater importance of demarcating the region’s bounds may 
be the creation of an inclusive identity for the Arctic states while excluding Asian countries. 
Canada and Russia, the two countries the most occupied with sovereignty, are also the most 
concerned with drawing strict environmental boundaries around the Arctic. Attempts to 
enclose the Arctic Ocean follow a general global trend of regionalizing maritime space, 
whereby “the projection of coastal regions over their adjacent waters (similarly imprecise) 
can also be included as one more way maritime space is being regionalised” (Suárez de 
Vivero et al., 2009, p. 633). Steinberg (2001, p. 24) argues that the ocean cannot be slotted 
into any of the three categories of space that world-systems theorists have devised: core, 
semi-periphery, or periphery. Yet in the Arctic, the imperative to bound and regionalize 
maritime space is causing countries to incorporate their ocean peripheries into their national 
territories. Parks Canada is creating a national maritime park in Lancaster Sound at the 
Northwest Passage’s eastern entrance, while the agency also leads multiple searches for 
British Arctic explorer John Franklin’s lost ships.42 As Deleuze (1994, p. 385) explains, “One 
of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize 
smooth spaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space. It is a vital 
concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control migrations and, more 
generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire exterior, over all of the flows traversing 
the ecumenon.” Quests to draw borders in the Arctic Ocean are deliberate attempts to 
regulate flows of ships, oil slicks, scientists, and capital.  !
The pressure from non-Arctic states to redefine the Arctic threatens the Arctic 
Council’s prerogative in defining the region’s extent. This is an unsettling geopolitical 
development for the Arctic Council because since its inception, the organization has helped 
to spatially order and temporally arrange the Arctic region (Dodds, 2012). Particularly as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For more on Parks Canada and the search for the Franklin ships, see Craciun (2012). In the 1820s, the British 
Colonial Office actually requested of Franklin to “amend the very defective geography of the northern part of 
North America” (in Craciun, 2012, p. 472). 
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new chair of the Arctic Council, Canada is creating an “imagined community” (Anderson, 
1991) in the Arctic by emphasizing a theme of “development for the people of the North” and 
“Northerners first” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2013). Canada is 
creating a strong inside-outside dynamic while the Nordic countries promote a more global 
envisioning of the Arctic. This difference exposes the constructed nature of the Arctic region. 
Political actors in southern capitals are the Arctic’s “region-builders,” to borrow Neumann's 
term (1994). They do the work of imagining “a certain spatial and chronological identity for a 
region, and [disseminating] this imagined identity to others” (Neumann, 1994, p. 58). If all 
region-building projects are attempts to discourage competing efforts that might impose a 
different regional ontology (Neumann, 1994, p. 67), then the Canadian-led region-building 
effort in the Arctic is essentially a defensive project to ward off non-Arctic actors from 
encroaching on the region’s perceived territorial periphery.43   
While the Asian states are attempting to convince the Arctic Council of the legitimacy 
of their actions, the Arctic Council, too, is undergoing a crisis of legitimacy and an internal 
debate over whether to pursue inclusivity or exclusivity. Swyngedouw (2004, p. 33) draws 
attention to “the tensions between the rhizomatic rescaling of the economic networks and 
flows on the one hand and the territorial rescaling of scales of governance on the other.” As 
the economic networks in the Arctic are rhizomatically rescaled, Canada and Russia seek to 
base Arctic governance on the possession of territory north of the Arctic Circle while the 
Nordic countries are more open to rhizomatically rescaling of the organization. At a KOPRI 
symposium in March 2013, the Danish Ambassador to South Korea stated, “The Danish 
position is that we welcome new observers. They’d add to the work of the Arctic Council and 
task forces. I don’t really care if there are 30 observers – it’s not going to dramatically change 
the workings of the Arctic Council. Networking is important, and presence is important” 
(Hansen, 2013). The Ambassador’s use of the words “networking” and “presence” 
demonstrates an understanding of the significance of the new relational, networked 
geography of the Arctic in which states can be “present” without territory and yet still 
contribute to the Arctic Council’s mission. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 The Arctic has not always been imagined as a circumpolar space, as Russia and Canada used to view each 
other as “mirror images” and relations are still sometimes adversarial (Lackenbauer, 2010). Thanks to the Arctic 
Council’s region-building efforts, however, Kim and Blank posit that East-West discord in the Arctic has been 
resolved, notably through the Barents Sea Agreement between Norway and Russia. Tensions between Asian and 
Russia countries – essentially, non-Arctic and Arctic – have replaced the former discord between the Arctic 
states themselves (Kim & Blank, 2011, p. 305). 
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5.2 The Arctic as an Asian Periphery 
 
The Arctic is no longer just a periphery for Europe and North America as it was for the past 
several centuries. Russia has always been aware of its “singular position between Europe and 
Asia” (Kerr, 1995, p. 978) and despite its historically ambiguous, even reluctant relationship 
with Asia, it has lately been gravitating towards working with Northeast Asia to develop its 
sub-Arctic areas.44 During a 2010 visit to the Far East, former President Dmitry Medvedev 
remarked, “Developing strategic ties with countries of the Asia-Pacific region is an important 
part of the Far Eastern strategy”45 (in Hong, 2012, p. 11). China, Japan, and Korea now see 
themselves as part of the core and are consequently treating the Arctic as a resource 
periphery. The extent and location of the periphery for these three countries has changed over 
time. China, long concerned with defending its territorial integrity, began constructing the 
Great Wall in the second century BC. The concept of the periphery in Chinese thought 
extends beyond the country’s physical border. One Chinese scholar told a group of American 
congressmen that the Middle East had become “a part of China’s salient periphery in a way 
that it had not been when China had been self-reliant in oil prior to 1993” (in Lampton, 2008, 
p. 34). By that token, if the Arctic becomes a crucial source of hydrocarbons to China, it 
could form part of that “salient periphery.” Likewise, Korean literature reveals that 
companies are considering making the Arctic a center of investment on the periphery in the 
country’s quest for natural resources. A Korean Economic Trends report states that further 
Korean resource development in the Arctic is likely to use KOGAS’ Canadian investments as 
a “springboard” (D.-S. Lee et al., 2013, p. 11). Finally, Japan is the one Asian country that 
has contained a part of the Arctic within its political borders before. In 1942, imperial Japan’s 
borders extended from southernmost Indonesia, near the equator, to the Aleutian Islands of 
Kiska and Attu in present-day Alaska. Japan sought possession of these two strategic islands 
partly because they would permit control of the Great North Circle Route.46 A few years 
prior, in 1935, U.S. General Billy Mitchell expressed a similar sentiment. He proclaimed to 
Congress, “I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 For a historical overview of Russia’s relationship with both Europe and Asia and its transformation into more 
of a Eurasian power, see Kerr (1995). 
45 On Russia’s strategy in its Far East region, see Rozman (2008). 
46 The Aleutian Islands themselves are a periphery of the periphery: the Arctic Marine Assessment Program 
(AMAP) area “essentially includes the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’N), and 
north of 62°N in Asia and 60°N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian 
chain” (AMAP, 2013). 
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the most important strategic place in the world” (in Zellen, 2009, p. 167). This belief echoes 
Mackinder's idea of a pivot area whose possession would be the key to unlock world 
domination (1904), except that in this case, the pivot is not continental Eurasia. It is maritime 
Alaska. Although hyperbolic, General Mitchell’s statement touched upon the importance of 
the North Pacific in connecting Asian and North American markets. Despite the 
advancements of air travel, shipping (especially in an age of just-in-time delivery) is still 
important for global markets today. Castells conceives of a “network society” and “space of 
flows” (1996), while Cairncross (2001) heralds the “death of distance” and the ease with 
which fiber optics transport ideas.47 Yet goods still need to be moved out of resource 
peripheries like parts of the Arctic to core markets in places like Asia, so proximity matters – 
especially when LNG takes only three days from Sakhalin instead of three weeks from the 
Suez Canal to reach Japan (Narod, n.d.).  
5.3 Cohering the North Pacific Arctic Region 
The densest area of connections between Asia and the Arctic is in the North Pacific, where 
the Asian states have their closest entry point to the Arctic Ocean. The North Pacific Arctic is 
already an economic region given the density of trade, shipping, and fishing. The Northeast 
Asian countries are simultaneously local participants in the North Pacific and global 
participants in other parts of the Arctic. Neither China, Japan, nor Korea consider the North 
Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean to be mare nostrum,48 as they instead portray the Arctic as 
a mare liberum49 – a sea open for navigation. But the extensive trade links between China, 
Japan, Korea and the Russian Far East, Alaska, and British Columbia demonstrate the rise of 
the North Pacific as Asia’s Arctic near abroad. Blatter (2004) states that peripheral border 
regions are important laboratories of change in the globalizing world. Border areas such as 
those in the North Pacific are redefining the larger Arctic region itself by demonstrating its 
relations to global markets. Furthermore, despite Kim and Blank’s assertion (2011) that 
tensions between Asia and Russia are rising, Russia, Japan, and Korea have recently 
intensified cooperation. Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Moscow to discuss energy, 
trade, and foreign policy epitomizes this turn. In addition, in 2012, Canadian Prime Minister !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Even ideas may not flow untrammeled. Research using patent citations as a paper trail to track the spread of 
ideas shows “international borders present a persistent barrier to spillovers” (Thompson, 2006). 
48 The Romans called the Mediterranean mare nostrum, or “our sea,” implying a sense of domain or ownership. 
Ermashev claimed in 1943 that the Americans sought to make the Arctic a new mare nostrum, while Wells 
(1986) purports that the Soviets wished to do so by turning it into a “Soviet lake” (in Horensma, 1991).  
49 Grotius (1964) is the first to conceive of the notion of mare liberum, or “open seas,” in 1625. 
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Stephen Harper traveled to Japan, Korea, and Thailand to discuss energy and free trade 
(Berthiaume, 2012), highlighting the increasing importance of Asia to the country’s economy 
and foreign policy.   
China, Korea, and Japan could build upon their claims as “near-Arctic states” to 
actually produce a Pacific Arctic region centered on the parts of their countries that are in fact 
nearest the Arctic. Russia and the northwest coast of North America could be plugged into 
such a region through trade ties and rhetorical framings. Calder (2012, p. 1) claims that in a 
globalized world, “mini-lateral configurations are also assuming growing importance, 
especially for specialized functional purposes.” He specifically proposes trilateral 
cooperation in the North Pacific between Japan, Canada, and the U.S. Enlarged regional 
cooperation across the North Pacific to also include China, Korea, and Russia would parallel 
the post-Soviet formation of the BSA, which Lehti (2003) argues was a Scandinavian project 
from its inception. The creation of the BSA turned the Baltic countries and even parts of 
northwest Russia into a “nordic near abroad” (Lehti, 2003, p. 216). Although the BSA was 
grounded in Sweden’s history and national narratives of being a former sea power in the 
Baltic Sea, it was also forward facing in that it was conceived of being an “alternative 
European centre, a future region” (Lehti, 2003, p. 216). Similarly, China, Japan, and Korea 
could try to turn the North Pacific into an alternative Arctic center distinct from the 
circumpolar region-building efforts in the North Atlantic emanating from and converging on 
Norway, most notably with the June 2013 opening of the Arctic Council’s Permanent 
Secretariat in Tromsø.   
An effort to create a North Pacific Arctic region would also parallel the development 
of the Barents Region, which combines traditionally “Arctic” and “near-Arctic” areas. In 
1993, foreign ministers meeting in Kirkenes, Norway proclaimed into existence the Barents 
Region, essentially an amalgamation of Arctic, Baltic, and North Sea areas (Neumann, 1994). 
This declaration sparked political efforts such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, an 
intergovernmental organization, and the Barents Regional Council, an interregional 
organization bringing together regions from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Political 
aspirations have turned into tangible measures on the ground to bring the region closer 
together, at least in terms of transportation links, by improving rail and road connections. 
Whereas most of the current connections are between northern destinations and their southern 
capitals, discourse about a Barents region has helped physically connect the space. 
Furthermore, efforts by authors such as Bengt Pohjanen to conjure an imagined community 
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stretching from Bodø to Naryan-Mar combat the image of Russia as the “Other,” instead 
incorporating it into a regional community (Heith, 2007). Given the success in creating a 
Barents region in a once divided, war-torn area,50 it is reasonable to speculate about the 
prospects of forming a Pacific Arctic region. If politicians and policymakers from China to 
British Columbia put more efforts into casting the area in a unified light, this discourse could 
result in greater physical linkages between locations in the North Pacific, and, eventually, 
perhaps shared norms. Ultimately, the process of region building promotes confidence-
building measures between countries (Ravenhill, 2000, p. 201). In the Barents Region, 
Norway and Russia gained enough mutual trust to finally agree to delimit their Barents Sea 
boundary after 40 years possibly thanks to discourse about the Barents Region. Yet 
confidence-building measures and regional frameworks differ. Whereas the former are 
designed to increase trust between two countries that might otherwise be at normative odds, 
the latter actually try to build shared norms.  
The main efforts at cooperation in the North Pacific have focused on commerce rather 
than identity. In the 1970s, in the spirit of the regionalization of maritime areas, policymakers 
and fishing industry representatives turned the North Pacific from “a space of overlapping 
domestic use in the global commons into a region divided into separate national territories” 
(Mansfield, 2001, p. 1808). At the same time, they “constituted it as a region based upon 
economic integration across national borders” (Mansfield, 2001, p. 1808), helping to manage 
the North Pacific fishery for Alaska pollock, one of the world’s largest and most valuable 
fisheries (NOAA, n.d.). Yet besides bolstering the North Pacific’s economic ties, the Asian 
states could harness the small but significant existing links that bind peoples and cultures 
around the North Pacific. A model exists around the Atlantic Ocean, where the United States, 
Canada, Iceland, Norway, and the United Kingdom have helped foster a North Atlantic 
identity (Taylor, 1991). Nineteenth-century European travellers and explorers perceived the 
Atlantic as “the borderlands of the civilized, European world” (Oslund, 2005, p. 92). But the 
ocean has shrunk to a small pond, and the North Atlantic has become both an American and 
European space under the security umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Only tourist agencies market Iceland’s exoticism, now almost seen as a desirable 
commodity.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Not all tension has disappeared in the Barents region. The 2007 riots by ethnic Russians in Estonia and 
Russia’s alleged cyberattacks on Estonia, carried out in revenge for the country’s relocation to a cemetery of the 
Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn, a Soviet statue that locals simply call the Bronze Statue, exemplifies 
residual animosity.   
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North Atlantic region building implies that similar efforts in the North Pacific are 
possible. In fact, some strands of a shared memory may already exist. Japanese 
anthropologists traipse around eastern Siberia seeking out ties to their country’s indigenous 
people, the Ainu (P. Vitebsky, personal communication, May 24, 2013) – included as an 
indigenous Arctic people in Walter Dallman’s map for the Arctic Human Development 
Report (Einarsson, Larsen, Nilsson, & Young, 2004). From 1898-1945, Russia, followed by 
Japan, controlled the northeastern Chinese city of Dalian, strategic for its ice-free port. 
Today, Dalian’s LNG terminal could receive Russian gas extracted with the help of Japanese 
technology, recreating the presence of previous foreign powers in the shape of capital flows. 
Additionally, a new flight service between Dalian and Irkutsk, Russia is materializing past 
connections through improved transportation linkages, with a local newspaper stating that the 
service makes Irkutsk “better connected as it links up with Russia’s past” (Baklitskaya, 
2013). But regional connections are not always apparent, for upon the 2012 reopening of 
flights between Siberia and Alaska, Vladivostok Air’s American representative expressed, 
“Now the great unknown is only four hours away” (Calkins, 2011).51  The unknown, 
however, may already be known to local residents, as “Siberia has long been a popular 
destination for American hunters and fisherman” (Calkins, 2011), and Anchorage School 
District was the first ever in the U.S. to start a Russian language immersion program (UAA, 
2013). Moreover, indigenous peoples living on both sides of the Bering Strait were once 
familiar with the “great unknown,” as they routinely crossed to the other side until the “Ice 
Curtain” descended in the Cold War (Schweitzer & Golovko, 1995; Sheldon, 1989).   
A venue for North Pacific cooperation may already exist: the often overlooked 
Northern Forum. This multilateral organization traces its origins to the First International 
Conference on Human Environment in Northern Regions hosted by the governor of 
Hokkaido in 1974 (The Northern Forum, n.d.). The Northern Forum includes 18 different 
northern regions, including Gangwon (Korea), Heilongjiang (China), and Hokkaido (Japan) – 
a clear case of Asian political integration into northern affairs. Trade and education are 
typically the main issues of discussion (Huebert, 1998), and the subnational participants 
involved often have common interests not necessarily shared with their national governments 
(Young, 2005). These Asian regions could tighten coordination with fellow Northern Forum 
members in the North Pacific: the Russian Republic of Sakha and the Chukotka Autonomous 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Yakutia Air actually ended up operating the flights.  
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Okrug, the state of Alaska, and Canada’s Yukon Territory.52 The degree of independence that 
the regional governments have in making economic and political decisions varies. Yet even 
in Russia, where Putin has moved to centralize power, regional forces remain “a force to be 
reckoned with” (Hyde 2001: 736). Similarly in China, Beijing “called Heilongjiang officials 
to task for their inadequate administration of regional trade with Russia” (Wishnick, 2001, p. 
810). Cities in Hokkaido, Primorskii Krai, and Alaska are in some cases closer to each other 
than they are from their respective national capitals thousands of miles away, making 
coordination in areas such as shipping logistics and the environment a real possibility.   
 Visions of sub-national regional collaboration in the North Pacific may help to 
redefine the imagined community of the Arctic while revealing alternatives to the Arctic 
Council’s state-based cooperation. Promoting region-building measures in the North Pacific 
could also grant the Asian countries the keys to further projecting power throughout the 
wider Arctic as global actors. Yet as Healey (2004, p. 65) writes, there is “no easy answer to 
developing a locally-relevant relational spatial conception and vocabulary.” A shift towards a 
form of governance that is simultaneously locally and globally relevant, accounting for all the 
mobilities, relations, and hubs and spokes of the North Pacific, would require complicated 
scale-jumping where local planners might consult with national ministers and circumpolar 
indigenous groups. Swyngedouw explains, “An inclusionary politics of scale necessitates a 
vision and strategy in which the current one-sided obsession with a politics of identity in 
which the body has become a central site is replaced by a rescripting and reconstruction of 
groups affinities” (2000, p. 74). The Arctic Council may already represent a progressive form 
of governance, but it is still grounded in the primacy of the nation-state and the structuring of 
an exclusive northern identity. Although it is making overtures to non-Arctic states by 
admitting them as observers, it is simultaneously strengthening regional cooperation and 
hardening the Arctic/non-Arctic binary. Furthermore, it may even be becoming a more 
traditional type of regional organization with a more permanent, rather than mobile, politics. 
Its permanent secretariat is located in the same building as the Norwegian Polar Institute in 
Tromsø, showing the success in the Norwegian government in creating “centres of expertise” 
that physically collocate institutes of national science and multinational governance.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Of the subnational units surrounding the North Pacific, British Columbia, Magadan, Khabarovsk, and 
Sakhalin are not members. Koryak, Kamchatka, and Primorskii Krai are Partner Regions rather than Full 
Member Regions. 
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Figure 5.1 The Northern Forum Members and Partners in the North Pacific.  
Furthermore, the establishment of a permanent secretariat symbolizes the growing 
entrenchment of the Arctic Council within the space it demarcates as Arctic. 
So far, as illustrated in chapter three, China, Japan, and Korea have instrumentalized 
the high seas of the Arctic rather than the near abroad of the North Pacific in their attempts to 
legitimize their polar activities. Even though China, Japan, and Korea rarely transit the high 
seas of the Central Arctic Ocean, they marshal its status as a global commons to promote 
their globalized visions of the Arctic. As such, there is a disparity between the economic 
region of the North Pacific where the Northeast Asian states are highly active and the 
perceptual region of the Arctic that they promote as a global space. Capitalizing instead on 
their relative proximity to the Arctic through the North Pacific, especially where the coastline 
connects activities at sea with activities on land, could possibly legitimize their activities in 
the Arctic. In the ports of Tobata, Vladivostok, and Dutch Harbor, the new mobilities of the 
Arctic are taking shape. The Korean-built, Russian-owned LNG tanker delivering Norwegian 
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gas to Japan along the NSR epitomizes these linkages. Such corridors of transit and 
movement can serve as the backbone for region-building processes. For instance, in the 
United Kingdom, the government has drawn up regions for investment such as the M11 
corridor, Thames Gateway, and The Northern Way (Macleod & Jones, 2007). These areas 
appear to be based on railroads, motorways, and rivers, “all emphasizing mobility, linkage, 
networks, connectivity” (Macleod & Jones, 2007, p. 1184). This relational ontology could 
one day apply to the NSR or the Great North Circle Route. Macleod and Jones (2007, p. 
1184) term these transit areas “relationally networked region(s).” Castells (2008, p. 82) 
argues that the management of global problems at the nation-state level leads to a crisis of 
efficiency. But as region building at the subnational level in the North Pacific would be based 
on connectivity, this could improve efficiency in governing and managing usage of the area. 
As it stands, the chief obstacles to region-building efforts in the North Pacific are twofold: 
first, the desire in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo for region building in Northeast Asia is weak.53 
Second, it is possible that voices in the Arctic Council could view the creation of a North 
Pacific Arctic region as a rival rather than as a useful tool for managing an existing economic 
region. 
 
5.4 A New Developmentality in the Arctic  
 
While China, Japan, and Korea are building links in the North Pacific, they are 
simultaneously investing in distant locales, suggesting an eventual need to reconceptualize 
the wider Arctic region. The Danish Ambassador quoted in chapter four is correct in noting 
that presence is important in the Arctic, yet it is important to distinguish between the 
presence of a foreign scientist and the presence of a foreign oil worker. Whereas Kuehls 
argues that the goal of natural resource development, or “developmentality,” was once to 
make resources suit the needs of the state, today, resources serve global capital. 
Developmentality thus “requires a shift in control from the local to the global” (1996, p. 78). 
For natural resources to serve international capital, foreign investors and multinational 
corporations must control them. As a resource periphery, the Arctic is a prime example of 
this shift in power. This transformation also weakens the Arctic Council’s ability to define 
the region as a territorially bounded unit. Yet whereas Kuehls claims that the agents behind !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 For Chinese perceptions on regional security in Northeast Asia, see Rozman (2011). For Korea’s perspective, 
see Konishi and Manyin (2009). For Japan’s view on cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, see Okawara and 
Katzenstein (2010). 
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global capital do not consult local populations, a novel form of developmentality may 
actually arise in parts of the Arctic where indigenous groups have a significant amount of 
autonomy, such as in Greenland or Canada. Greenland’s newly elected prime minister, Aleqa 
Hammond, declared, “We are not giving up our values for investors’ sake” (MacAlister, 
2013). Though flows of Asian capital may still make the resources flow out, locals may 
demand consultation with Asian businessmen before extraction can begin, representing a new 
shift in developmentality. 
The new economic space of the Arctic is not entirely rhizomatic, as foreign states, 
particularly Asian ones, and multinational corporations vertically impose many of the flows 
of capital and people. Yet these vertical impositions could actually generate rhizomatic cross-
cultural encounters between Asia and the Arctic. Plans to build mines in Greenland staffed by 
thousands of Chinese employees would create what Ferguson (1998) termed “enclaves” in 
his study of railway projects and mines in Zambia’s Copperbelt region staffed by African 
guest workers. Companies do not always succeed in keeping the enclaves separate from the 
surrounding milieu constituted by the local people and environment. In the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, fly-in Russian oil workers and the local reindeer herders covertly 
exchange diesel and reindeer meat (R. Rouillard, presentation, May 28, 2013). Resources 
from the tundra to the multinational oil corporation continue to flow vertically outward, but at 
the same time, horizontal networks radiate from the enclave to surrounding local 
communities. Yet in the new developmentality that may unfold in the Arctic, investments 
may extend beyond commercial, extractive transactions and actually be deliberately 
horizontal and rhizomatic: recall the Beijing Review editorial (Baozhi, 2013), which 
recommended that China should emphasize its identity as a “public goods provider” to people 
in the Arctic. In the same vein, Japan might choose to publicize projects with perceived 
benefits to northern residents, such as a recent ten-kilometer bridge that Russian First Deputy 
Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov has invited the country to build between Sakhalin and 
mainland Russia (“Shuvalov,” 2013), over pipelines and mines, which are perceived as more 
extractive technologies. Depending on domestic politics, opportunities to act as a “public 
goods provider” may abound in infrastructure-poor places like Greenland, Northern Canada, 
and possibly even Iceland as it recovers from the economic crisis of 2008.!!!!
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5.5 Relational Networks, Subnational Spaces 
Relational networks in the Arctic are bringing together vastly disparate areas north and south 
of the Arctic Circle in a way that seemingly weakens the importance of territory. But 
proximity continues to influence economic relations in the Arctic, and melting sea ice and 
new technologies are challenging previously held conceptions of proximity. There are still 
important contiguous areas that are hubs of economic activity, namely the North Atlantic and 
North Pacific. Multilateral efforts to enable region building and ultimately governance along 
international throughways such as the NSR are probably a long way off (although the recent 
memorandum of understanding between Norway and Korea to promote shipping along the 
NSR may be a precursor).54 In the meantime, the sub-national regions bordering the North 
Pacific maritime space can enhance region-building measures through discourse that builds 
upon and accentuates the region’s connections, perhaps with the Northern Forum as a starting 
point. China, Japan, and Korea can frame the North Pacific periphery as not only an Arctic 
space, but actually as their Arctic near abroad. This would establish a territorial foundation 
from which they could demonstrate their cooperative intentions and project influence farther 
north into the Arctic. Whether the Arctic Council would prefer an argument from the 
Northeast Asian countries for Arctic legitimacy based on proximity rather than more tenuous 
tropes such as a “global polar culture” remains to be seen.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 On the memoranda of understanding signed between Norway and Korea, see Bennett (2012).  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
Depicting the Arctic as an isolated, impenetrable, and frozen space overlooks the region’s 
integration with other parts of the world in the present and throughout history. Networks and 
relations are a crucial aspect of activities in the circumpolar north, especially when scientific 
collaboration and natural resource extraction require large amounts of capital and 
cooperation. In this light, the Arctic Council’s promotion of “self-sufficient” Arctic 
communities (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013) ignores both the realities of export-driven, 
commodities-based northern economies and the interconnected nature of Arctic communities. 
Instead, fostering ties with areas south of the Arctic Circle that demand the Arctic’s resources 
may actually provide more fruitful results for Arctic communities if economic development 
is the main goal. The Arctic Council’s approval of the Asian countries’ applications for 
observer status demonstrates the body’s acknowledgement of the globe-spanning 
consequences of Arctic issues, whether environmental or economic.  
 Flows of capital, goods, and people are connecting Chinese consumers with mineral 
deposits in Greenland and Korean engineers with Russian oil oligarchs. The Arctic’s 
maritime nature makes it both accessible and important for the seafaring powers of China, 
Japan, and Korea. Their commercial interests in the Arctic involve shipping, hydrocarbons, 
and fisheries. Yet questions of identity and power projection are also paramount. The Arctic 
allows the Northeast Asian countries a forum to display their growing capabilities through 
scientific endeavors and maritime transits. Though peaceful, these displays still have 
geostrategic undertones. An analysis of scientists’ and policymakers’ discourse reveals a 
disparity in the attempts of countries like China to situate themselves as near-Arctic, which 
underscores the continuing importance of territory and proximity, while at the same time 
promoting a global polar culture. Instead, China, Japan, and Korea could arguably pursue a 
strategy of region building in the North Pacific – their Arctic near abroad – as a foothold into 
the Arctic. 
The Arctic is arguably on the front lines of climate change, but it is also on the front 
lines of experiments in governance. If Heilongjiang, Gangwon, and Hokkaido work with 
subnational governments in Russia, the U.S., and Canada to govern the North Pacific, this 
CONCLUSION 
 53 
could increase the confidence of Russia and Canada, the two Arctic states most concerned 
with sovereignty, in working with their Northeast Asian neighbors. China, Japan, and Korea 
could then cultivate the ties necessary for broader multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. 
Cooperation based on the Northern Forum would still privilege territory and proximity. But 
fundamentally, governance does not have to be fixed to territory. A more mobile politics 
would suit the growing mobilities of the Arctic, especially in the North Pacific and, later, 
along the NSR. Governance based on such corridors, however, might further obscure the 
uneven nature of development in the Arctic by focusing on the wormholes that allow rapid 
export of northern commodities to the core.  
A useful way to build confidence and possibly even overlapping identities between 
the Arctic and Asian countries might be to cultivate a shared memory of experiences, 
elevating transactional, commercial relationships to something more substantive. While the 
western media sometimes responds incredulously to Asia interest in the Arctic, it was only 
seventy years ago that Arctic and Asian countries came to blows in the sub-Arctic. A 
Japanese website documenting a ceremony held in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 2002 to 
commemorate the World War II Aleutian Islands Campaign between the United States, 
Canada, and Japan avows, “You will never be able to forget that we patriots committed to 
fight each other in this area of severe weather” (“Attu,” 2002), underscoring the fragments of 
shared experience that persist in the North Pacific. Moreover, northern residents, long 
ignored by their southern capitals, may be happily receptive to foreign investment. Following 
the KOGAS delegation’s visit to the Northwest Territories to explore building an LNG 
terminal, the mayor of Tuktoyaktuk expressed, “They were even willing to help us get natural 
gas into Tuktoyaktuk. Our own government can't do that, but a foreign country wants to help 
us. They're good people” (Vanderklippe, 2011). Shared identities in the North Pacific could 
translate into regional governance based on lines of human activity and experience that 
radiate outward to other parts of the planet rather than arbitrary lines like the Arctic Circle. 
For as Craciun (2009, p. 109) writes, “The Arctic is not an uninhabited, timeless waste found 
on the fringes of the planet – it inhabits a centre. The most obsessive Northwest Passage 
seekers always recognized this.” Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul now do, too. 
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